2008

National Summary

State Teacher Policy Yearbook

What States Can Do To Retain Effective New Teachers



Acknowledgments

STATES

State education agencies remain our most important partners in this effort, and their extensive experience has helped to ensure the factual accuracy of the final product. Every state formally received a draft of this edition of the State Teacher Policy Yearbook in August 2008 for comment and correction; states also received a final draft of their reports a month prior to release. All but four states graciously responded to our inquiries. While states do not always agree with our approach, the willingness of most states to acknowledge the imperfections of their teacher policies is an important first step toward reform.

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About the Yearbook

The 2008 edition of the *State Teacher Policy Yearbook* provides an in-depth analysis of a critical piece of the teacher quality puzzle: **the retention of effective new teachers.**

Unlike the comprehensive analysis of all aspects of states' teacher policies provided in the 2007 *Yearbook*, this year's edition focuses on a particular policy issue. The 2009 *Yearbook* will revisit and evaluate the states' progress in meeting the full set of goals first analyzed in 2007, as well as the new goals examined this year.

The third through fifth years of teaching represent an opportunity lost for the health of the teaching profession. Many new teachers leave at this juncture, just at the time that they are becoming consistently effective. Concurrently, school districts confer permanent status more commonly understood as tenure—at this juncture, absent either the reflection or evidence that this important decision merits.

While school districts are certainly key players in teacher retention, do not underestimate the state's role. Without exception, the state controls virtually every aspect of the teaching profession particularly licensing and tenure. This edition of the *Yearbook* analyzes what each state is doing to identify teachers' effectiveness; support the retention of valuable, early career teachers; and dismiss those found to be ineffective, with each of these factors measured against a realistic blueprint for reform.

The process used to develop the policy goals that appear in this edition has stayed the same. We began to develop these goals with our own distinguished advisory board, and then sought feedback from more than 100 different policy groups, academics, education think tanks and national education organizations, some of which have perspectives that are quite different from ours. Most importantly, we also consulted with the states themselves. Their feedback was invaluable.

This year's goals meet NCTQ's five criteria for an effective reform framework:

- 1. They are supported by a strong rationale, grounded in the best research available. (A full list of the citations supporting each goal can be found at **www.nctq.org/stpy**.)
- 2. They offer practical, rather than pie-in-the-sky, solutions for improving teacher quality.
- 3. They take on the teaching profession's most pressing needs, including making the profession more responsive to the current labor market.
- 4. They are for the most part relatively cost neutral.
- 5. They respect the legitimate constraints that some states face so that the goals can work in all 50 statess.

This national report includes a state-by-state summary, as well as a summary of state performance for each of the 15 goals. We also point to states that offer a "Best Practice" for other states to emulate.

Users can also download any of our 51 state reports (including the District of Columbia) from our website at **www.nctq.org/stpy**. Each state *Yearbook* includes detailed analyses and data for each of the goals, with charts and graphs showing how the state performed compared to all other states.

We hope this edition of the *Yearbook* serves as an important resource for state school chiefs, school boards, legislatures and the many advocates who press hard for reform. In turn, we maintain our commitment to listen and learn.

Sincerely,

Kate Walsh, President

Executive Summary: Goals

Area 1: What states can do to help identify effective teachers

Goal 1: State data systems

The state should develop a data system that contributes some of the evidence needed to assess teacher effectiveness.

Goal 2: Evaluation of effectiveness

The state should require instructional effectiveness to be the *preponderant* criterion of any teacher evaluation.

Goal 3: Tenure

The state should require that tenure decisions be meaningful.

Area 2: What states can do to help retain effective teachers

Goal 1: Induction

The state should require effective induction for all new teachers, with special emphasis on teachers in high-needs schools.

Goal 2: Licensure advancement

The state should ensure that the only factors required when moving from a probationary to a nonprobationary license are those known to advance teacher effectiveness.

Goal 3: Pay scales

The state should give local districts full authority for pay scales, eliminating potential barriers such as state salary schedules and other regulations that control how districts pay teachers.

Goal 4: Retention pay

The state should support retention pay, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure is awarded, for effective teachers.

Goal 5: Compensation for prior work experience

The state should encourage districts to provide compensation for related prior subject-area work experience.

Goal 6: Differential pay for shortage areas

The state should support differential pay for effective teaching in shortage and high-need areas.

Goal 7: Performance pay

The state should support performance pay, but in a manner that recognizes its infancy, appropriate uses and limitations.

Goal 8: Pension flexibility

The state should ensure that pension systems are portable, flexible and fair to all teachers.

Goal 9: Pension neutrality

The state should ensure that pension systems are neutral, uniformly increasing pension wealth with each additional year of work.

Area 3: What states can do to help exit ineffective teachers

Goal 1: New teacher evaluation

The state should require multiple formal evaluations of all new teachers.

Goal 2: Unsatisfactory evaluations

The state should articulate consequences for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations, including specifying that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations are eligible for dismissal.

Goal 3: Licensure loopholes

The state should close loopholes that allow teachers who have not met licensure requirements to continue teaching.

Executive Summary: Key Findings

1. States grant teachers tenure without considering whether they are effective.

States do virtually nothing to establish teachers' effectiveness in the classroom before awarding them permanent employment status—more commonly known as tenure.

- Although all states control how and when local districts award teachers tenure, only two
 - states require any evidence of teacher effectiveness to be considered as part of tenure decisions. All other states permit districts to award tenure virtually automatically.
- Even if states did have a process that connected tenure to teachers' effectiveness, 44 states allow teachers to earn tenure in three years or less, which is not enough time to accumulate sufficient objective data about teacher perfor-

mance. **Three** states award teachers permanent status after a single year of teaching.

In addition to—but generally separate from the tenure process, all states also confer 'profes-

2 states require any evidence of effectiveness to be considered as part of tenure decisions

44 states allow teachers to earn tenure in three years or less sional' licenses, a stage of licensure that should signal the state's confidence in teachers' capabilities. To move from a probationary to a permanent, nonprobationary license, only **16** states require any evidence of effectiveness, and only **one** of these states requires this evidence to be the preponderant criterion for awarding permanent licenses to teachers.

2. States are not doing enough to help districts identify effective teachers.

Determining which teachers will be effective before they begin to teach remains an elusive goal. The absence of predictive indicators creates a critical need to identify whether teachers are effective as soon as possible, before tenure is awarded.

 Only 23 states require that *new* teachers be evaluated more than once each year, a necessary component for determining effectiveness.
 Nine states do not require *any* evaluations of new teachers. Further, only **16** states require that new teachers be evaluated early in the school year, ensuring that feedback and support is received in a timely manner.

- Only four states require evidence of student learning to be the preponderant criterion in teacher evaluations. Just 15 states require *any* objective measures of student learning. Twenty-two states do not even require that teacher evaluations must include classroom observations.
- Twenty-two states do not accept any responsibility for ensuring that teachers are evaluated consistently and appropriately. These states do not require districts to use a state-developed

instrument, approve locally developed instruments or provide any guidance that would

23 states require that new teachers be evaluated more than once each year

4 states require evidence of student learning to be the preponderant criterion in teacher evaluations hold teachers accountable for classroom effectiveness.

Longitudinal data systems are essential to the use of value-added data to measure teacher performance, and it is much more efficient to build these systems at the state level, rather than at the local level. Although most states have the preliminary pieces of data systems in place, only **19** states have the capacity to match individual teacher records. Of these 19 states, only **two** use value-added data to assess teacher effectiveness.

3. States are complicit in keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom.

Although it is local districts that hire and fire teachers, states could do considerably more to ensure that ineffective teachers do not remain in the classroom indefinitely.

- Only 13 states specify that teachers who have been rated unsatisfactory on multiple evaluations should be eligible for dismissal. Just 26 states require that teachers who receive even one unsatisfactory evaluation are placed on an improvement plan.
- Licensure tests are meant to ensure that an individual meets the minimal qualifications to be a teacher, yet 22 states permit teachers to remain in the classroom for three years or more without passing all required licensing tests. A mere seven states require teachers

13 states specify that teachers who have been rated unsatisfactory multiple times should be eligible for dismissal

22 states permit teachers to remain in the classroom for three years or more without passing licensing tests to pass all tests before entering the classroom.

Forty-two states still allow teachers in classrooms holding only emergency licenses in at least some circumstances, although this practice is supposedly banned under the No Child Left Behind Act. More than half of these states issue *renewable* emergency licenses, meaning that teachers who have not met all minimum requirements are allowed to remain in classrooms for extended —and perhaps indefinite—periods of time.

4. State policies raise barriers and offer few incentives to retain effective teachers.

In the areas of compensation, certification and induction, there is much more states could do to support the retention of effective teachers early in their careers.

States mandate burdensome requirements for permanent certification that have no re-

lationship to teacher effectiveness. Twenty states require teachers to complete additional coursework that is not specifically targeted to improve their practice, a requirement that amounts to little more than seat time. **Five** states require teachers to earn advanced degrees in order to get a professional license, despite extensive research that shows these degrees do not improve classroom performance.

- More than half of the states do not require that local districts provide new teachers with adequate support. Thirteen states have no statelevel requirements for new-teacher induction, and 14 states require only limited or weak support.
- **Seventeen** states require districts to adhere to a state-dictated salary schedule that sets minimum pay for every level, and **18** states require districts to pay more to teachers who have earned advanced degrees, which have been shown repeatedly to bear no connection to teacher effectiveness.

• Only 28 states help districts by providing incentives (differential pay or loan forgiveness) to teach

states require districts to pay more to teachers with advanced degrees

states have either no or weak requirements for new teacher support

in high-needs schools, and just 26

states provide incentives to teach shortage subject areas such as mathematics or science.

• Of the **20** states that support performance pay, not all have programs that recognize its appropriate uses and limitations. Only 16 states explicitly connect performance pay to evidence of student achievement, and only 13 states ensure that all teachers are able to participate, whether or not they have students who take standardized tests.

• Only **five** states ensure that districts fairly compensate new teachers who bring with them relevant prior work experience.

Not a single state encourages local districts to provide significant pay increases to teachers when they are awarded tenure, a milestone in a teacher's career that should be significant, but is instead automatic. Such pay increases would be smart policy if tenure decisions were based on a review of evidence of teacher effectiveness

5. State pension systems are generally inflexible and unfair to all teachers, but they particularly disadvantage teachers early in their careers.

States continue to provide teachers with expensive and inflexible pension plans that do not reflect the realities of the modern workforce.

• A mere **three** states offer teachers the option of selecting a defined contribution plan as their primary pension plan; one additional state provides only a defined contribution plan. The

portability of these plans can be attractive to an increasingly mobile workforce.

Forty-eight states make teachers wait more than three years to vest in their pension plans; nine

states make teachers wait for 10 or more years. Teachers who leave the system before vesting do not receive benefits upon retiring; they can only withdraw their funds. In some states, teachers are not even entitled to withdraw the full amount they contributed.

Pension systems also disadvantage teachers early in their careers by overly committing districts' resources to retirement benefits, leaving little room to provide benefits that might be of more immediate relevance to new teachers. Local districts in some states are required to

contribute as much as 20 percent of their teachers' salaries to the pension system and/or Social Security.

 Twenty states do not allow teachers to purchase time for approved leaves of absence, such as maternity or paternity care, which are common for teachers early in their careers. An-

4 states offer teachers a defined contribution plan as their primary pension plan

45 states pay out much more in retirement benefits to some teachers than others by allowing early retirement based on years of service other **18** states limit how much time can be purchased.

- Fifteen states use a formula to calculate retirement benefits that changes based on number of years of teaching, meaning that some years of teaching are worth more than others when it comes to pension benefits. In these states, more experienced teachers receive even more generous benefits.
- Forty-five states pay out much more in retirement benefits to some teachers than others by allowing early retirement based on years of service, at a price of hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional benefits per teacher. For example, a

teacher allowed to retire at age 50 collects 15 years of benefits more than a teacher with comparable experience who retires at age 65.

Figure A

Summary grade chart

	ldentifying effective teachers	Retaining effective teachers	Exiting ineffectve teachers	Overall		Identifying effective teachers	Retaining effective teachers	Exiting ineffectve teachers	Overall
South Carolina	С	C+	А	B-	Nebraska	D-	C-	D+	D+
Alabama	D+	C-	В	С	Nevada	D-	D	B-	D+
New Jersey	D	C-	В	С	Pennsylvania	D	D	B-	D+
New Mexico	C-	D	В	С	Texas	C-	D+	D+	D+
Ohio	D+	C+	C+	С	Utah	D	С	C-	D+
Oklahoma	D	C-	В	С	Virginia	D-	С	C-	D+
Tennessee	В	C-	D	С	Arizona	D-	D+	D+	D
Arkansas	D-	С	C+	C-	Hawaii	D	D	D+	D
Colorado	D-	C-	В	C-	Indiana	D-	C-	D	D
Delaware	D+	D+	C+	C-	Massachusetts	D-	D+	D+	D
Florida	С	C-	C-	C-	Minnesota	D-	D+	D	D
Louisiana	D+	С	C-	C-	North Dakota	F	D-	C+	D
North Carolina	D+	С	C-	C-	Wisconsin	D-	D+	D-	D
Washington	D-	C-	B-	C-	Wyoming	D-	D	C-	D
West Virginia	D	D	В	C-	Idaho	F	D	D+	D-
Alaska	D-	C-	C-	D+	Maryland	F	D+	D+	D-
California	D-	С	D	D+	New York	F	D+	D	D-
Connecticut	D+	D	С	D+	Oregon	F	D	D	D-
Georgia	D+	D	C+	D+	South Dakota	F	С	F	D-
Illinois	D	D-	В	D+	District of Columbia	F	F	D	F
lowa	D+	C-	D+	D+	Maine	F	C-	F	F
Kansas	D-	C-	D+	D+	Montana	F	D-	F	F
Kentucky	D+	D+	D+	D+	New Hampshire	F	D-	F	F
Michigan	D	C-	D+	D+	Rhode Island	D-	D	F	F
Mississippi	D+	D	D+	D+	Vermont	F	D	F	F
Missouri	C-	D-	C-	D+					

Figure B States successfully addressing teacher quality goals Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers 🐞 Best Practice States Meeting Goal Goal 1: State Data Systems Tennessee Goal 2: Evaluation of Effectiveness Florida South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas Goal 3: Tenure **Best Practice** Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers States Meeting Goal Goal 1: Induction South Carolina Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, West Virginia Goal 2: Licensure Advancement New Mexico Goal 3: Pay Scales Goal 4: Retention Pay North Carolina California Goal 5: Compensation for Prior Work Experience Goal 6: Differential Pay for Shortage Areas Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming Goal 7: Performance Pay Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah Goal 8: Pension Flexibility Alaska Minnesota Goal 9: Pension Neutrality Alaska, South Dakota **Best Practice** Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers States Meeting Goal Goal 1: New Teacher Evaluation Kansas, Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Oklahoma Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia Goal 2: Unsatisfactory Evaluations Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, **Oklahoma**, Washington Goal 3: Licensure Loopholes Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey South Carolina, Virginia

State Summaries: Introduction

The following pages summarize each state's progress in meeting the *Yearbook* goals. An overall grade is provided for each state, as well as a grade for each of the three areas: Identifying Effective Teachers, Retaining Effective Teachers, and Exiting Ineffective Teachers.

For more detailed information about each state's performance, please see its individual state report, available at: **www.nctq.org/stpy/reports**.

How is Alabama Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Alabama's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, Alabama does not use this system to provide valueadded evidence of teacher effectiveness. Its teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Alabama's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Although Alabama's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of its pilot performance pay program, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Alabama neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in highneeds schools or shortage subject areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Its pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

Alabama's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are stronger than many states yet still leave room for improvement. The state requires three observations of new teachers annually, with the first occurring in the fall; however, the state fails to insist that teachers who do not improve on a professional development plan after multiple unsatisfactory evaluations be considered automatically eligible for dismissal. In addition, although Alabama issues nonrenewable emergency certificates, it still allows teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is **Alaska** Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Alaska's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Alaska requires classroom observations as part of teacher evaluations, it offers minimal direction to districts about additional evaluation content, including requiring the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning. Alaska's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Alaska does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Alaska does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state has a pilot performance pay program; however, Alaska's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Alaska does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas. The state, however, does have commendable pension policies. Alaska offers flexibility to its teachers by providing retirement benefits through a fair, portable defined contribution plan.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Alaska requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, the state does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. Unfortunately, the state does not require subject-matter testing for new teachers and allows them to teach for up to three years until they apply for the professional teaching certificate.

How is Arizona Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Arizona's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Arizona requires classroom observations as part of teacher evaluations, it offers minimal direction to districts about additional evaluation content, including requiring the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning. Arizona's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Although Arizona does not require mentoring or induction support for all new teachers, the state does target new-teacher retention in high-needs schools. Its requirements for a nonprobationary license are more reasonable than those in many states; however, Arizona does not base advancement on specific evidence of teacher effectiveness. Arizona does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state has a performance pay program, but its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Arizona does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. While Arizona offers teachers leaving the system more flexibility than most states do, its pension policies are not fair to all teachers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Arizona's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are weakened by a lack of specificity. The state requires two evaluations a year for new teachers but does not ensure an evaluation occurs early in the year. The state has only a vague requirement of "assistance" for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations and does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. The state also issues renewable emergency licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for more than one year.

How is Arkansas Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Arkansas's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are sorely lacking. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, Arkansas does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state also does not direct districts to base teacher evaluations on subjective or objective measures of student learning. Arkansas's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

Arkansas's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Arkansas offers differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, and the state supports a performance pay initiative; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Arkansas neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Its pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Arkansas's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. The state requires only one evaluation a year for new teachers, and although Arkansas requires an improvement plan for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, no state policy addresses whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, Arkansas issues nonrenewable provisional certificates, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is California Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

California's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although California requires classroom observations as part of teacher evaluations, the state fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. California's probationary period for new teachers is just two years, and the state does not require any mean-ingful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

California requires mentoring for new teachers in high-needs schools. The state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are more reasonable than those in many states; however, California does not base advancement on specific evidence of teacher effectiveness. Although the state does not support retention bonuses, its other policies regarding teacher compensation are commendable. California gives districts authority for how teachers are paid and supports compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, and a performance pay initiative. However, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. While California offers teachers more flexibility to purchase time than the policies of most states, its pension policies are not portable or fair to all teachers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

California's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. The state requires only one evaluation a year for new teachers, and although California requires an improvement plan for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, no state policy addresses whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. The state also issues renewable provisional licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to two years.

How is **Colorado** Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Colorado's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Colorado's requirements regarding teacher evaluations are too ambiguous to ensure the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning. Colorado's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Colorado requires that all new teachers receive mentoring. The state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are more reasonable than those in many states; however, Colorado does not base advancement on specific evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state gives districts authority for how teachers are paid and has differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools, but its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Colorado does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. While Colorado offers teachers leaving the system more flexibility than most states, its pension policies are not fair to all teachers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Colorado requires new teachers to be formally evaluated only once a year, it does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. Commendably, the state also requires that all teachers pass all required subject-matter tests as a condition of initial licensure.

How is **Connecticut** Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Connecticut's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are in need of improvement. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Connecticut requires evidence of student performance garnered through multiple measures in teacher evaluations, the state does not require subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, to be the *preponderant* criterion. Connecticut's probationary period for new teachers is a reasonable four years, but the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Connecticut requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Connecticut does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Connecticut does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Connecticut's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C

Exiting ineffective teachers

Connecticut's policies for exiting ineffective teachers often fall short. The state requires only one evaluation a year for new teachers, and although Connecticut requires an improvement plan for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, no state policy addresses whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, Connecticut issues nonrenewable interim certificates, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is **Delaware** Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Although Delaware has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state commendably includes subjective and objective evidence of student learning in its teacher evaluations but fails to make it the *preponderant* criterion. Delaware's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Delaware requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are more reasonable than those in many states; however, Delaware does not base advancement on specific evidence of teacher effectiveness. With the exception of support of compensation for relevant prior work experience, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Delaware neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Its pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Delaware's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers leave room for improvement. Although the state requires the equivalent of two formal evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall, it does not make teachers eligible for dismissal until they have received unsatisfactory ratings for three consecutive years. In addition, Delaware issues emergency certificates, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to three years.

How is **District of Columbia** Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

The District of Columbia's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are severely lacking. The District has only one of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and it does not have a policy governing the design or implementation of teacher evaluations. It also lacks policy concerning probationary periods for teachers prior to attaining permanent status and does not address any process evaluating cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: F

Retaining effective teachers

The District of Columbia does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the District's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. The District does give local school districts authority for how teachers are paid, but its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. The District does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the District provides teachers only a defined benefit pension plan, to which it makes no or only minor contributions. Its pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

The District of Columbia does not address the number of times new teachers must be evaluated and has no policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. Although it issues only nonrenewable transitional certificates, it still allows teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is Florida Faring?

Area 1: C

Identifying effective teachers

Florida's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are headed in the right direction but still leave room for improvement. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Commendably, the state not only directs districts to use both subjective and objective measures of student performance in their teacher evaluations, but also makes student performance the preponderant criterion. However, Florida's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Florida requires that only some of its new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Although the state does not support retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience, Florida's other policies regarding teacher compensation are commendable. Florida does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and it supports both differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas and performance pay. The state also has a flexible pension system that gives teachers a choice between a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan. While Florida is commended for providing teachers with the option of a fair, portable defined contribution plan, its defined benefit plan is not fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits in the defined benefit plan are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although requiring only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, Florida does require that all teachers who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. Unfortunately, Florida issues renewable temporary certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is Georgia Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Georgia's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. The state has all the elements of a studentand teacher-level longitudinal data system, but it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Although Georgia requires evidence of student performance garnered through multiple measures in teacher evaluations, the state does not require subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, to be the *preponderant* criterion. Georgia's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Georgia does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Georgia does offer compensation for relevant prior work experience and differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Georgia neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Its pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Georgia's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. Georgia requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, and although the state requires that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan, no state policy explicitly directs districts to make teachers who receive multiple unsatisfactory evaluations eligible for dismissal. In addition, Georgia issues nonrenewable waiver certificates, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is Hawaii Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

Hawaii's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Its teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Hawaii's probationary period for new teachers is only one year, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Hawaii does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of its support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Hawaii neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid, nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. While Hawaii offers teachers leaving the system more flexibility than most states do, its pension policies are not fair to all teachers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although it requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, Hawaii does mandate that teachers who receive an overall unsatisfactory rating be immediately dismissed. The state also issues renewable emergency licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to four years.

How is **Idaho** Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

Idaho's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only one of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Idaho offers only minimal direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, failing to require the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. Idaho's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Idaho offers minimal guidance regarding induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. The state does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, but its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Idaho does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Idaho's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Idaho requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the first half of the school year, the state fails to articulate consequences, such as mandatory improvement plans, for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations. The state does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. Idaho also issues nonrenewable interim certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is **Illinois** Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

Illinois's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers often fall short. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system. Its teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Illinois's probationary period for new teachers is a reasonable four years, but the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: D-

Retaining effective teachers

Illinois does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of its support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Illinois neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. The state's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Illinois requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, the state does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. Commendably, Illinois grants only nonrenewable, nine-month provisional certificates to out-of-state teachers who have not met licensure requirements.

How is Indiana Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Indiana's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system. State law prohibits districts from considering the results of annual state assessments when evaluating teachers, and its language is too vague to ensure that districts will require classroom observations. Although Indiana's probationary period for new teachers is a commendable five years, the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Indiana's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. However, Indiana's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Indiana neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Indiana's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Indiana requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, the state does ensure that this evaluation occurs during the first half of the school year. However, the state lacks any policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, Indiana issues renewable emergency permits, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is **lowa** Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Although lowa has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, the state does include student performance on teacher evaluation instruments. However, it fails to require this as well as evidence of student learning garnered through objective measures, such as standardized test results, as the preponderant criterion in teacher evaluations. lowa's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and although the state mandates additional requirements to qualify for permanent status, lowa does not ensure that cumulative teacher effectiveness is the preponderant criterion in tenure decisions.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

lowa requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. The state does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and it supports differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas as well as performance pay, but Iowa's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Iowa does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Iowa's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

lowa's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are sorely lacking. The state fails to address the number of times new teachers must be evaluated. Further, although lowa requires improvement plans for teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations, it does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, the state has adopted subject-matter requirements for only elementary teachers, and it allows new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach on its nonrenewable teaching license for up to one year.

How is Kansas Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Although Kansas has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, the state does include student performance on teacher evaluation instruments. However, it fails to require this as well as evidence of student learning garnered through objective measures, such as standardized test results, as the *preponderant* criterion on teacher evaluations. Kansas's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Kansas requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Kansas does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Kansas does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. The state's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Commendably, Kansas requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall; however, the state fails to articulate a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, Kansas issues a nonrenewable teaching license, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year, and a prestandard license, allowing teachers from some states to teach for up to two years without passing subject-matter assessments.

How is **Kentucky** Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Kentucky's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, Kentucky does not use this system to provide valueadded evidence of teacher effectiveness. Its teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Kentucky's probationary period for new teachers is a reasonable four years, but the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Although Kentucky's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas and performance pay, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Kentucky neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Kentucky's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Kentucky's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers leave room for improvement. Although the state requires the equivalent of two formal evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall, the state does not address whether teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations must be placed on improvement plans or whether consequences result from having multiple unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, Kentucky also issues renewable emergency certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for more than one year.

How is Louisiana Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Louisiana has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and the state commendably uses its value-added data to assess certain aspects of teacher effectiveness. However, the state fails to require evidence of student learning garnered through objective and subjective measures as the *preponderant* criterion of teacher evaluations. Louisiana's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

Louisiana's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. With the exception of its support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas and performance pay, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Louisiana neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Louisiana's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Louisiana requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, the state does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. However, the state issues temporary certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the class-room for up to three years.

How is Maine Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

Maine's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Maine offers little direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, failing to require the use of subjective or objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. Maine's probationary period for new teachers is at most two years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Maine requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Maine does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Maine does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Maine's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: F

Exiting ineffective teachers

Maine's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are severely lacking. The state does not address the number of times new teachers must be evaluated annually, and it lacks policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, Maine offers conditional certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is Maryland Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

Maryland's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are sorely lacking. The state does not have any of the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Maryland's teachers are evaluated for instructional effectiveness, the state fails to require the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning. Maryland's probationary period for new teachers is only two years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Maryland only requires mentoring for some new teachers, and the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Maryland does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools, but Maryland's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Maryland does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Maryland's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Commendably, Maryland requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall; however, the state fails to articulate a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, Maryland issues conditional certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to two years.

How is Massachusetts Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Massachusetts's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Massachusetts fails to require the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning in teacher evaluations. The probationary period for new teachers in Massachusetts is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Although Massachusetts's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Massachusetts does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Massachusetts does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. The state's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Massachusetts's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. The state requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers and has no policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, although Massachusetts issues only nonrenewable temporary and emergency certificates, it still allows teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is Michigan Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

Michigan's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Michigan requires classroom observations as part of teacher evaluations, it fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Michigan's probationary period for new teachers is a reasonable four years, but the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Michigan requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Michigan does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports performance pay, but its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Michigan does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Michigan's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Michigan's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. The state requires only one evaluation a year for new teachers, and although an improvement plan is required for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, Michigan does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. The state also issues renewable emergency licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for more than one year.

How is Minnesota Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Minnesota's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness leave room for improvement. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Minnesota's performance pay plan includes a teacher evaluation system that requires classroom observations and evidence of student achievement gains, this program is optional. Michigan's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Minnesota does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements to advance to a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Minnesota does give districts authority for how teachers are paid and it supports performance pay, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Minnesota does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Minnesota's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. However, the state is commended for providing retirement benefits determined by a formula that is neutral, meaning that pension wealth accumulates uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

Minnesota's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. Although the state requires three evaluations a year for new teachers, Minnesota does not ensure an evaluation occurs early in the year. Minnesota also fails to articulate a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, the state issues renewable temporary licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is Mississippi Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Mississippi's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness leave room for improvement. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Mississippi's teacher evaluation system considers limited measures of student learning, but the state fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Mississippi's probationary period for new teachers is a mere 12 months, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Mississippi requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Mississippi neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Mississippi's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Mississippi does not address the number of times new teachers must be evaluated annually, the state does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. The state also issues licenses that allow some new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for six years or more.

How is **Missouri** Faring?

Area 1: C-

Identifying effective teachers

Missouri's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Missouri's teacher evaluation system considers limited measures of student learning, but the state fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Missouri's probationary period for new teachers is a commendable five years, but the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D-

Retaining effective teachers

Missouri requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of support for performance pay, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. Missouri neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Missouri's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Missouri requires the equivalent of at least two formal evaluations of new teachers, but the state fails to explicitly require one evaluation in the first half of the school year. Although the state does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan, Missouri does not address whether multiple unsatisfactory evaluations would make a teacher automatically eligible for dismissal. The state also issues renewable temporary certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is Montana Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

Montana's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Montana does not articulate any policy regarding teacher evaluations. Montana's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D-

Retaining effective teachers

Montana does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Montana does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Montana does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Montana's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: F

Exiting ineffective teachers

Montana does not have policies that address exiting ineffective teachers. The state neither mandates the number of times new teachers must be evaluated annually, nor has it articulated policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. Montana has also not implemented mandatory subject-matter testing as part of its teacher certification process.

How is Nebraska Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Nebraska's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Nebraska fails to require the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning in teacher evaluations. Nebraska's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Nebraska requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Nebraska does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Nebraska does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Nebraska's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Nebraska's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are lacking. Although the state requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the first half of the school year, Nebraska fails to articulate a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. Unfortunately, Nebraska has also not implemented mandatory subject-matter testing as part of its teacher certification process.

How is Nevada Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Nevada's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Nevada requires classroom observations as part of teacher evaluations, it fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Nevada's probationary period for new teachers is only two years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Nevada does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Nevada does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Nevada does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Nevada's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Nevada's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are better than most states but still leave room for improvement. Although the state commendably requires three annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall, Nevada fails to articulate a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. As of 2010, Nevada will commendably require that all teachers of core subject areas pass subjectmatter tests before entering the classroom.

How is New Hampshire Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

New Hampshire's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and New Hampshire does not offer any direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, including requiring the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. New Hampshire's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D-

Retaining effective teachers

New Hampshire does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements to advance to a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. New Hampshire does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. New Hampshire does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. New Hampshire's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: F

Exiting ineffective teachers

New Hampshire's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are severely lacking. The state does not address the number of times new teachers must be evaluated annually, and no policy has been articulated regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, New Hampshire offers intern licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is **New Jersey** Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

New Jersey's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers often fall short. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although New Jersey's teacher evaluation system considers measures of student learning, it fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. New Jersey's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any mean-ingful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Although New Jersey's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. New Jersey does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. New Jersey does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides teachers only a defined benefit pension plan, to which employers make only minor contributions. New Jersey's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

New Jersey's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are better than most states but still leave room for improvement. Although the state requires three annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the first half of the school year, no policy has been articulated regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. Commendably, the state also requires that all teachers pass all required subject-matter tests as a condition of initial licensure.

How is **New Mexico** Faring?

Area 1: C-

Identifying effective teachers

New Mexico's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, New Mexico does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state's teacher evaluation system considers multiple measures of student learning, but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. New Mexico's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and although the state mandates additional requirements to qualify for permanent status, no policies ensure that cumulative teacher effectiveness is the preponderant criterion in tenure decisions.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

New Mexico requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state commendably factors teacher effectiveness into the advancement from a probationary to a nonprobationary license, ensuring that only effective teachers will advance. With the exception of giving districts authority for how teachers are paid, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. New Mexico does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. New Mexico's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although New Mexico requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, the state does require that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. Commendably, the state also requires that all teachers of core subject areas pass subject-matter tests before entering the classroom.

How is **New York** Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

New York's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system. Not only does the state prohibit the use of student performance data in teacher evaluations, but it also does not require any use of objective measures as evidence of student learning. New York's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and although the state requires evaluation of teacher effectiveness throughout this period, no policies require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

New York requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. New York does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. New York does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. New York's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

New York's policies for exiting ineffective teachers fall short. The state requires only one evaluation a year for new teachers, and although New York requires an improvement plan for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, the state does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, New York issues conditional initial licenses, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to two years.

How is North Carolina Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

North Carolina's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are lacking. The state has only one of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and North Carolina fails to require the use of objective measures such as standardized tests as evidence of student learning in teacher evaluations. North Carolina's probationary period for new teachers is a reasonable four years, but the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

North Carolina's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. North Carolina commendably supports compensation for relevant prior work experience, as well as differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and a performance pay initiative, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. North Carolina neither gives districts authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or differential pay for teachers working in subject shortage areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. North Carolina's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

North Carolina's policies for exiting ineffective teachers often fall short. Although the state requires the equivalent of three evaluations a year for new teachers, it does not ensure an evaluation occurs early in the year. In addition, North Carolina requires an improvement plan for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, but, except for those teachers in low-performing schools, the state does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. North Carolina also issues lateral entry certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is North Dakota Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

North Dakota's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and the state does not offer any direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, including requiring the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. North Dakota's probationary period for new teachers is merely one year, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D-

Retaining effective teachers

North Dakota does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. North Dakota does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. North Dakota does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. The state's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although North Dakota requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall, the state fails to articulate consequences, such as mandatory improvement plans, for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations and does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, North Dakota issues alternative access licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to one year.

How is **Ohio** Faring?

Area 1: D+

Identifying effective teachers

Ohio has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and the state uses its value-added data to improve classroom instruction. Although the state considers student performance when evaluating teachers, its policies fail to require evidence of student learning garnered through objective and subjective measures as the preponderant criterion of teacher evaluations. Ohio's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: C+

Retaining effective teachers

Ohio requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Ohio does offer differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and subject shortage areas, and the state supports performance pay; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Ohio neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. However, the state provides a flexible pension system that gives teachers a choice between a defined contribution plan, a defined benefit plan and a combination plan. While the state is commended for providing teachers with the option of a fair, portable defined contribution plan, its defined benefit and combined plans are not fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits in the defined benefit plan are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Ohio requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the first half of the school year, the state fails to articulate consequences, such as mandatory improvement plans, for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations and does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, Ohio issues supplemental licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to one year.

How is **Oklahoma** Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

Oklahoma's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are in need of improvement. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Oklahoma requires measures of student learning in its teacher evaluations, the state does not require subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, to be the preponderant criterion. Oklahoma's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Oklahoma requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Oklahoma does offer differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and subject shortage areas, and the state supports performance pay; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Oklahoma neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Oklahoma's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

Oklahoma's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are better than most states but still leave room for improvement. Commendably, the state requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall. Oklahoma also requires that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. However, the state also issues emergency licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for more than one year.

How is **Oregon** Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

Oregon's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Oregon offers no direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, including requiring the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. Oregon's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded permanent status.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Oregon does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. With the exception of giving districts full authority for how teachers are paid and support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Oregon does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas, or performance pay. The state provides only a hybrid pension plan for teachers. While this plan has aspects that make it more flexible, overall it is not portable or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

Oregon's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. The state only requires one evaluation a year for new teachers, and although an improvement plan is required for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations, the state does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, Oregon issues transitional licenses, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to three years.

How is **Pennsylvania** Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

Pennsylvania's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, Pennsylvania does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Its teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Pennsylvania's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Pennsylvania requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Pennsylvania does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Pennsylvania does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. The state's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Pennsylvania's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are weakened by a lack of specificity. The state requires two evaluations a year for new teachers but does not ensure an evaluation occurs early in the year. Further, although Pennsylvania requires that teachers who receive two consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations be formally eligible for dismissal, the state does not address whether these teachers must be placed on improvement plans. In addition, the state issues emergency certificates, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is Rhode Island Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Rhode Island's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are lacking. The state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, but does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state does not articulate any policy regarding teacher evaluations. Rhode Island's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Rhode Island requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. In addition, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Rhode Island does not give districts full authority for how teachers are paid, nor does the state support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Rhode Island's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers; for example, teachers must have 10 years of service to vest. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: F

Exiting ineffective teachers

Rhode Island's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are severely lacking. It neither addresses the number of times new teachers must be evaluated nor does it have a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. The state also issues renewable emergency permits, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for more than one year.

How is South Carolina Faring?

Area 1: C

Identifying effective teachers

South Carolina's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are headed in the right direction but still leave room for improvement. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, South Carolina does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Commendably, the state directs districts to use both subjective and objective measures of student performance in their teacher evaluations and makes student performance the preponderant criterion. However, South Carolina's probationary period for new teachers is only two years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C+

Retaining effective teachers

South Carolina's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license seem appropriate for new teachers. South Carolina does offer differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and subject shortage areas, and the state supports performance pay; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. South Carolina does not give districts full authority for how teachers are paid, nor does the state support retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. However, the state has a flexible pension system that gives teachers a choice between a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan. While the state is commended for providing teachers with the option of a fair, portable defined contribution plan, South Carolina's defined benefit plan is not fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits in the defined benefit plan are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: A

Exiting ineffective teachers

South Carolina's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are stronger than many states. Commendably, the state requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall. South Carolina also requires that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan; however, only annual contract teachers are made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. The state also commendably requires that all teachers of core subject areas pass subject-matter tests before entering the classroom.

How is **South Dakota** Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

South Dakota's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and South Dakota fails to articulate policy regarding teacher evaluations. The probationary period for new teachers in South Dakota is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

South Dakota does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements to advance to a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. South Dakota does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and the state supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools as well as performance pay; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. South Dakota does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. While South Dakota offers teachers leaving the system more flexibility than most states, its pension policies are not fair to all teachers. The state is commended for providing retirement benefits determined by a formula that is neutral, meaning that pension wealth accumulates uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: F

Exiting ineffective teachers

South Dakota's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are severely lacking. It neither addresses the number of times new teachers must be evaluated nor does it have a policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. The state also issues renewable one-year certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to two years.

How is **Tennessee** Faring?

Area 1: B

Identifying effective teachers

Tennessee's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are better than most states, but still leave room for improvement. Not only does Tennessee have all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, the state commendably uses these value-added data to determine teacher effectiveness. The state is also commended for requiring both subjective and objective measures of student performance in its teacher evaluations and for making student performance a necessary criterion. However, Tennessee's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Tennessee requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. With the exception of support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas and performance pay, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Tennessee neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Tennessee's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D

Exiting ineffective teachers

Tennessee's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are sorely lacking. Although the state requires the equivalent of two to three formal evaluations of new teachers a year, it articulates neither when the first evaluation should occur nor policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. In addition, Tennessee issues renewable interim and alternative licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is **Texas** Faring?

Area 1: C-

Identifying effective teachers

Although Texas has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, the state commendably requires both subjective and objective measures of student performance in its teacher evaluations and makes student performance a necessary criterion. However, Texas's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Texas does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements for permanent licenses are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Texas does support compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, and performance pay, but the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Texas neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. The state's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D+

Exiting ineffective teachers

Texas's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are lacking. The state requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, and although Texas requires that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan, whether these teachers are eligible for dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory evaluations is unclear. Texas also issues emergency licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is **Utah** Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

Utah's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state also fails to require that districts use subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning in their teacher evaluations. Utah's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

Utah requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Utah does give districts authority for how teachers are paid and supports differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas as well as performance pay; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Utah does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, or differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Utah's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Utah's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are weakened by a lack of specificity. The state requires two evaluations a year for new teachers but does not ensure an evaluation occurs early in the year. The state also requires that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan, but does not address whether multiple negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. Utah also issues conditional and alternate licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

How is **Vermont** Faring?

Area 1: F

Identifying effective teachers

Vermont's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Vermont offers only minimal direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, failing to require the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. Vermont's probationary period for new teachers is only two years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Vermont does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, but the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Vermont does give districts authority for how teachers are paid and supports differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Vermont does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Vermont's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: F

Exiting ineffective teachers

Vermont's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are severely lacking. It does not address the number of times new teachers must be evaluated and has no policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. The state also issues provisional licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to two years.

How is Virginia Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Virginia's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Virginia's requirements regarding teacher evaluations are too ambiguous to ensure the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. The probationary period for new teachers in Virginia is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C

Retaining effective teachers

Virginia requires that all new teachers receive mentoring, but the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are burdensome and have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Virginia does give districts authority for how teachers are paid and supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Virginia does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Virginia requires only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers. The state fails to articulate consequences, such as mandatory improvement plans, for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations and does not address whether negative evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. Commendably, the state requires that all teachers of core subject areas pass subject-matter tests before entering the classroom.

How is Washington Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Washington's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and although Washington's teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations, the state fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. Washington's probationary period for new teachers is only two years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: C-

Retaining effective teachers

Although it is not required, Washington provides a mentoring program for new teachers, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. With the exception of Washington's support for differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Washington neither gives districts full authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. The state provides a flexible pension system that gives teachers a choice for their pension plan between a defined benefit plan and a hybrid plan. While the hybrid plan has aspects that make it more flexible, overall both plans are not portable or fair to all workers. The state is commended for offering a benefit formula that is more fair than most states; however, the formula is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Washington's policies for exiting ineffective teachers are better than most states. Commendably, it requires the equivalent of two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall. Further, the state requires that teachers, regardless of employment status, who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. However, Washington issues limited certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to two years.

How is West Virginia Faring?

Area 1: D

Identifying effective teachers

West Virginia's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness often fall short. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. West Virginia's teacher evaluation system uses classroom observations but fails to require evidence of student learning through objective measures such as standardized test scores. West Virginia's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Although West Virginia's policies for new teacher induction are commendable, the state's requirements for permanent licenses have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. In addition, the state's policies regarding teacher compensation are sorely lacking. West Virginia neither gives districts authority for how teachers are paid nor supports retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas, or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. West Virginia's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: B

Exiting ineffective teachers

West Virginia's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are stronger than many states yet still leave room for improvement. The state requires two annual evaluations of new teachers, with the first occurring in the fall, and the state requires an improvement plan for teachers receiving unsatisfactory evaluations. However, no state policy addresses whether multiple unsatisfactory evaluations would make a teacher eligible for dismissal. In addition, although West Virginia only issues nonrenewable temporary certificates, it still allows teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for up to one year.

How is **Wisconsin** Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Wisconsin's policies regarding the identification of effective teachers are sorely lacking. The state has only two of the three necessary elements for the development of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, and Wisconsin's requirements regarding teacher evaluations are too weak to ensure the use of subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. Wisconsin's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D+

Retaining effective teachers

Wisconsin offers minimal guidance regarding induction support for new teachers, but the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license are a step in the right direction toward measuring classroom performance. Wisconsin does give districts authority for how teachers are paid and supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools; however, the state's other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Wisconsin does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience, differential pay for teachers working in shortage subject areas or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Wisconsin's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: D-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Wisconsin's policies regarding the exiting of ineffective teachers are severely lacking. The state requires new teachers to be formally evaluated only once during their first year of teaching and fails to articulate any policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. Wisconsin also issues renewable emergency permits, allowing teachers who have not passed licensing tests to teach for more than one year.

How is **Wyoming** Faring?

Area 1: D-

Identifying effective teachers

Wyoming's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are lacking. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, Wyoming does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. The state also offers minimal direction to districts about teacher evaluation content, including subjective and objective measures, such as standardized tests, as evidence of student learning. Wyoming's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state lacks any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

Area 2: D

Retaining effective teachers

Wyoming does not require mentoring or any other induction support for new teachers, and the state's requirements to advance to a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Wyoming does give districts authority for how teachers are paid and supports differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas; however, its other policies regarding teacher compensation need improvement. Wyoming does not support retention bonuses, compensation for relevant prior work experience or performance pay. In addition, the state provides only a defined benefit pension plan for teachers. Wyoming's pension polices are not portable, flexible or fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

Area 3: C-

Exiting ineffective teachers

Although Wyoming requires two evaluations a year for new teachers, it does not ensure an evaluation occurs early in the year. Also, the state fails to articulate policy regarding teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations. Unfortunately, Wyoming requires subject-matter testing only for elementary education and social studies teachers, and it issues emergency licenses, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to one year.

Goal Summaries: Introduction

The following pages summarize states' overall progress in meeting the Yearbook goals.

The rationale and supporting research for each goal are available at: **www.nctq.org/ stpy.**

For more information about each state's performance, please see its individual state report, available at: www.nctq.org/stpy/reports.

Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers Goal 1 – State Data Systems

The state should develop a data system that contributes some of the evidence needed to assess teacher effectiveness.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should establish a longitudinal data system with at least the following key components:
 - A unique statewide student identifier number that connects student data across key databases across years;
 - A unique teacher identifier system that can match individual teacher records with individual student records; and
 - An assessment system that can match individual student test records from year to year in order to measure academic growth.
- 2. Value-added data provided through the state's longitudinal data system should be considered among the criteria used to determine teachers' effectiveness.

FINDINGS

Value-added data can provide a fair measure of teacher effectiveness, by comparing the performances of a particular teacher's students at the start of the school year to their end-of-year performances. Longitudinal data systems are needed to put value-added models in place, and it is much more efficient to build these systems at the state level, rather than at the local level. To measure teacher effectiveness, state data systems must have three elements: unique student identifiers that connect student data across key databases, unique teacher identifiers that can be matched with individual student records and an assessment system that can match individual student records over time.

Figure 1

How States are Faring in the Development of Data Systems



0 States Meet Goal

2 States Nearly Meet Goal Louisiana, Ohio

16 States Partly Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,

Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming


• 31 States Meet a Small Part of Goal

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin

) 1 State Does Not Meet Goal Maryland

Figure 2

Do states use value-added data as a criterion for assessing teacher effectiveness?



1 Ohio uses value-added data to "improve classroom instruction", but it is unclear whether the information plays any role in teacher evaluations. Tennessee uses value-added data to measure teacher effectiveness by isolating the impact each teacher has on individual students' academic growth, which can be used as part of a teacher's evaluation. Nearly all states have the preliminary pieces in place. Forty-nine states have a student identifier system that connects data across key databases; 46 states have a teacher identifier system; and 48 states can match student test records over time. However, states have made considerably less progress in the key function necessary for value-added data. Only 19 states currently have the capacity to match student records to teacher records.

At present, only two states use value-added data as a criterion for assessing teacher effectiveness. Because this methodology is new and still presents significant challenges to how it can be applied, it is not surprising that states are moving slowly. However, with continued development and proper usage, value-added data can provide important evidence of teacher effectiveness.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Tennessee not only has all three elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system—unique student identifiers that connect student data across key databases across years, unique teacher identifiers that enable the state to match individual teacher records with individual student records, and the capacity to match student test records from year to year to measure student academic growth—it is also the only state that uses this value added data to measure teacher effectiveness by isolating each teacher's impact on individual students' academic growth. It translates this impact into a "teacher effect" score, and then uses it as part of a teacher's evaluation.


Figure 3

Do state data systems have the capacity to reliably assess teacher effectiveness?

·	Unique student identifier that connects data across databases	Unique teacher identifier system	Test records match over time	Individual student records match with teacher records
Alabama				
Alaska				
Arizona				
Arkansas				
California				
Colorado				
Connecticut				
Delaware				
District of Columbia				
Florida				
Georgia				
Hawaii				
Idaho				
Illinois				
Indiana				
lowa				
Kansas				
Kentucky				
Louisiana				
Maine				
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Minnesota				
Mississippi				
Missouri				
Montana				
Nebraska				
Nevada				
New Hampshire				
New Jersey				
New Mexico				
New York				
North Carolina				
North Dakota				
Ohio				
Oklahoma				
Oregon				
Pennsylvania				
Rhode Island				
South Carolina				
South Dakota				
Tennessee				
Texas				
Utah				
Vermont				
Virginia				
Washington				
West Virginia				
Wisconsin				
Wyoming				
	49	46	48	19

Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers Goal 2 – Evaluation of Effectiveness

The state should require instructional effectiveness to be the preponderant criterion of any teacher evaluation.



GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should either require a common evaluation instrument in which evidence of student learning is the most significant criterion or should specifically require that student learning be the preponderant consideration in local evaluation processes. Evaluation instruments, whether state or locally developed, should be structured so as to preclude a teacher from receiving a satisfactory rating if found ineffective in the classroom.
- 2. Evaluation instruments should require classroom observations that focus on and document the effectiveness of instruction.
- 3. Teacher evaluations should consider objective evidence of student learning, including not only standardized test scores, but also classroombased artifacts such as tests, quizzes and student work.

FINDINGS

States fail to ensure that formal evaluations will identify whether teachers are effective, because they do not require that evaluations be based primarily on teachers' impact on students.

Only four states require that evidence of student learning be the preponderant criterion in evaluating teachers' performance. In all other states, it may be possible for ineffective teachers to receive satisfactory evaluation ratings because classroom performance is not the preponderant criterion. Twenty-two states do not even require teacher evaluations to include classroom observations, and 36 states do not require evaluations to include any objective measures of student learning. Without objective evidence—which need not be limited to standardized test scores—states and local districts cannot hold teachers accountable for their performance.

Figure 5

State efforts to consider classroom effectiveness

Alabama		Requires evaluation to include classroom observation		Requires evidence of student learning to be the preponderant criterion for teacher evaluation
Arizona	Alabama			
Arkansas	Alaska			
California	Arizona			
Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Connecticut District of Columbia District of Columbia Connecticut District of Columbia District of Columbia Connecticut District Dis	Arkansas			
Connecticut	California			
Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Iowa Maryland Iowa Maryland Iowa Maryland Iowa Maryland Iowa Iowa <tr< td=""><td>Colorado</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr<>	Colorado			
District of Columbia	Connecticut			
Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Indiana <t< td=""><td>Delaware</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>	Delaware			
Georgia	District of Columbi	a 🗌		
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Hawaii Image: Sector of the sector of th	Georgia			
Ilinois				
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North Dakota Ohio Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Oregon Pennsylvania Pennsylvania South Carolina South Carolina South Dakota Image: South Dakota<	iten ioni			
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Utah ³				
Vermont Virginia Virginia Virginia Visconsin V				
Virginia				
Washington Image: Constraint of the second	Vermont			
West Virginia	Virginia			
Wisconsin Wyoming	Washington			
Wyoming	West Virginia			
	Wisconsin			
	Wyoming			
		20	15	

While states do not have to require districts to adopt a single evaluation instrument, they do have a responsibility to ensure that teacher effectiveness is evaluated consistently and appropriately. Twenty-two states do not accept this responsibility. These states do not require the use of a state-developed instrument, approve locally developed instruments or provide any regulatory guidance needed to ensure that local districts hold teachers accountable for classroom effectiveness.

Figure 6

Sources of Objective Evidence of Student Learning

Many educators struggle to identify possible sources of objective student data. Here are some examples.

- Standardized test scores
- Periodic diagnostic assessments
- Benchmark assessments that show student growth
- Artifacts of student work connected to specific student learning standards that are randomly selected for review by the principal or senior faculty, scored using rubrics and descriptors
- Examples of typical assignments, assessed for their quality and rigor
- Periodic checks on progress with the curriculum coupled with evidence of student mastery of the curriculum from quizzes, tests and exams

Figure 5

- 1 Louisiana has an *optional* teacher evaluation system that does make explicit the need to include objective measures of student learning as part of the teacher evaluation.
- 2 Although Minnesota does not have policies regarding teacher evaluations, the state has implemented an *optional* teacher evaluation system based on evidence of student learning as measured by observations and objective measures, such as student achievement data.
- 3 For teachers participating in Utah's career-ladder program, in which teachers earn incentives for taking on additional responsibilities, teacher evaluations must include evidence of student achievement gains.

Figure 7

Do states direct how teachers should be evaluated?

	All districts must use state- developed instrument	Districts must use state- developed instrument OR local equivalent approved by state		State provides guidance but does not approve locally developed instruments	State has no role in evaluation instrument
Alabama					
Alaska					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut					
Delaware					
District of Columbia					1
Florida					
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana					
lowa					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland					
Massachusetts					
Michigan					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
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Nebraska					
Nevada					
New Hampshire					
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
New York					
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Ohio					
Oklahoma					
Oregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					1
South Carolina					
South Dakota					1
			_		
Tennessee					
Texas				_	
Utah					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
	8	4	2	15	22

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Florida explicitly requires teacher evaluations to be based primarily on evidence of student learning. The state requires evaluations to rely on classroom observations as well as objective measures of student achievement, including state assessment data. South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas also structure their formal evaluations so that teachers cannot get an overall satisfactory rating unless they also get a satisfactory rating on classroom effectiveness.

Figure 7

¹ The District of Columbia, Montana, Rhode Island and South Dakota have no state policies regarding any aspect of teacher evaluations.

Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers Goal 3 – Tenure

The state should require that tenure decisions be meaningful.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. A teacher should be eligible for tenure after a certain number of years of service, but tenure should not be granted automatically at that juncture.
- 2. The state should articulate a process, such as a hearing, that local districts must administer in considering the evidence and deciding whether a teacher should receive tenure.
- 3. Evidence of effectiveness should be the preponderant criterion in tenure decisions.
- 4. The minimum years of service needed to achieve tenure should allow sufficient data to be accumulated on which to base tenure decisions; five years is the ideal minimum.

FINDINGS

Tenure should be a significant and consequential milestone in a teacher's career. Unfortunately, the awarding of tenure occurs virtually automatically in just about all states, with little deliberation or consideration of evidence of teacher performance. Teacher effectiveness in the classroom, rather than years of experience, should be the preponderant criterion in tenure decisions.

States often claim that the awarding of tenure is a local decision over which they have no authority. However, all 50 states have tenure policies that identify the number of years a teacher must complete before earning tenure. States must extend these policies to identify a process, such as a hearing, that local districts would be required to administer, where the cumulative evidence of teacher effectiveness would be considered and a determination would be made whether to award tenure. Only two states require any evidence of teacher effectiveness to be part of tenure decisions.

Most states also require probationary periods that are too short to allow for the accumulation

Figure 8 How States are Faring on Tenure Image: Provide the system of the s

42 States Do Not Meet Goal

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming of sufficient data on teacher effectiveness to support meaningful tenure decisions. The majority of states require probationary periods of only three years, and 10 states allow teachers to be granted tenure in two years or less.


Figure 9

How are tenure decisions made?

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE


Unfortunately, no state has an exemplary policy that NCTQ can highlight as best practice for granting tenure. Only **lowa** and **New Mexico** consider evidence of teacher effectiveness when making tenure decisions, although it is not the preponderant criterion. **New York City**, however, has taken some significant steps that could serve as a model for both states and districts.

In February 2008, the New York City Department of Education launched its Principals' Portal, allowing the city's 1,500 principals access to a Tenure Toolkit, designed to ensure that the city's teachers achieve a certain level of effectiveness prior to being granted what should be a meaningful title. To achieve this objective, principals are encouraged to work with their teachers throughout the entire three-year probationary period and to utilize the Teacher Development Toolkit, which offers resources for improvement. The city's criteria for granting tenure include "significant professional skill," evidenced by lesson plans and observations, and "a meaningful, positive impact on student learning," measured by a broad range of possible student work products, including reports, projects and test scores. Interestingly, initial tenure numbers indicate a trend toward discretion. The number of teachers denied tenure, as well as those placed on an extended probationary period, has doubled from the previous school year, before the Toolkit was implemented on the Portal.



 lowa and New Mexico. However, teacher effectiveness based on multiple years of data is not preponderant criterion.





- Figure 11 1 Period may be extended to four years if prescribed by district and agreed to by employee. 2 Period may not "exceed" two years. 3 District may extend period to three years on individual basis. 4 New teachers with three consecutive satisfactory evaluations may qualify after one year.

How long before a teacher earns tenure?

No 1 2 3 3 years <	How long before a						_
Alaska		No policy	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
Arizona	Alabama						
Arkansas	Alaska						
California	Arizona						
Colorado	Arkansas						
Connecticut	California						
Connecticut	Colorado						
Delaware							
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Ilinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky							
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Louisiana Maine² Maryland³ Massachusetts Minnesota Minnesota							
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Maryland ³ Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Newada ⁴ New Hampshire							
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South Dakota Image: Constraint of the sector of	Rhode Island						
Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Image: Stress Str	South Carolina						
Texas Image: Constraint of the system of	South Dakota						
Utah Image: Constraint of the second secon	Tennessee						
Utah Image: Constraint of the second secon	Texas						
Vermont							
Virginia Image: Constraint of the second s							
Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming							
West Virginia Wisconsin Image: State	-						
Wisconsin							
Wyoming	-						
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Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 1 – Induction

The state should require effective induction for all new teachers, with special emphasis on teachers in high-needs schools.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should require that new teachers be provided with a high-quality mentoring experience.
- 2. The state should ensure that new teachers receive mentoring of sufficient frequency and duration, especially in the first critical weeks of school.
- 3. Mentors should be carefully selected based on evidence of their own classroom effectiveness and subject-matter expertise. Training should be provided to mentors, and their performance as mentors should be evaluated.
- 4. Induction programs should include only strategies that can be successfully implemented even in a poorly managed school. Such strategies include intensive mentoring, seminars appropriate to grade level or subject area, a reduced teaching load and frequent release time to observe other teachers.

FINDINGS

Mentoring and induction are critical needs of new teachers, especially of teachers beginning their careers in high-needs schools. Unfortunately, more than half of the states do not require that local districts provide new teachers with adequate support. Thirteen states have no state-level requirements for new teacher induction, and 14 states require only limited or weak support.

Even the states with more promising induction policies still have room for improvement. Only 13 states ensure that new teachers will have mentors in the critical first weeks of school. Just 16 states require the selection of mentors be based on meaningful criteria, and only 14 states require the evaluation of mentors' performance.

Figure 12

How States are Faring on Induction Best Practice State South Carolina 9 States Meet Goal

Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, West Virginia

14 States Nearly Meet Goal Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa,

Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia


States Partly Meet Goal Arizona, California, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington

5 States Meet a Small Part of Goal Florida, Idaho, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin

13 States Do Not Meet Goal

Alaska, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Wyoming

How many states have policy that articulates the elements of an effective induction program?



In addition, only 19 states require induction programs to include a variety of strategies that can be successfully implemented even in poorly managed schools.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE


South Carolina requires that all new teachers, prior to the start of the school year, be assigned mentors for at least one year. Districts carefully select mentors, who must undergo additional training, based on experience and similar certifications and grade levels. Adequate release time is mandated by the state so that mentors and new teachers may observe each other in the classroom, collaborate on effective teaching techniques and develop professional growth plans. Mentor evaluations are mandatory and stipends are recommended.

Do states have policies that articulate the elements of effective induction?

Strong

Figure 14

Do states have policies that articulate the elements of effective induction?



Alaska	Alaska		No induction	induction	induction
Arizona Arkansas	Arizona Arkansas	Alabama			
California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Ildinosi Indiana Iowa Kansas Colisiana Maryland Minesota Mississippi Mississippi Missouri Montana New Jarseka New Jarseka New Jarseka New Jarseka New Jarseka North Carolina Origon Origon Pennsylvania South Dakota Origon Pennsylvania South Carolina South Carolina Corigon Pennsylvania South Carolina	Arkansas	Alaska			
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Connecticut	Colorado	Arkansas			
Connecticut	Connecticut	California			
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North Carolina	North Carolina	New Mexico			
North Dakota	North Dakota	New York			
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Virginia	Virginia				
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Wisconsin Wyoming	Wisconsin				
Wyoming	Wyoming				
· · ·	· · ·				
13 14 24	13 14 24	Wyoming			
			13	14	24

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 2 – Licensure Advancement

The state should ensure that the only factors required when moving from a probationary to a nonprobationary license are those known to advance teacher effectiveness.



GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should base advancement from a probationary to a nonprobationary license on evidence of classroom effectiveness.
- 2. The state should not require teachers to fulfill general, nonspecific coursework requirements to advance from a probationary to a nonprobationary license.
- 3. The state should not require teachers to have an advanced degree as a condition of permanent licensure.

FINDINGS

There are two points in most teachers' careers at which they move from probationary to permanent status. One is tenure, which involves a change from probationary to permanent employment status. The other involves moving from probationary to nonprobationary licensure status, which grants a teacher the continuing right to practice in a particular state. In nearly all states, the conferral of tenure and the conferral of professional licenses are separate and unrelated.

More states require evidence of teacher effectiveness for the awarding of professional licenses than require such evidence for the granting of tenure; however, the majority of states do not consider classroom performance in licensure decisions. Only 16 states require any evidence of effectiveness, and only one of these states requires this evidence to be the preponderant criterion.

Many states also demand new teachers fulfill requirements that do not serve to advance teacher effectiveness in order to receive their professional licenses. Five states require teachers to earn master's degrees, despite extensive research showing that master's degrees do not have any significant

correlation to classroom performance. Twenty states require teachers to complete general, nonspecific coursework requirements. While targeted requirements may potentially expand teacher knowledge and improve teacher practice, general, nonspecific coursework requirements merely call for teachers to complete a certain amount of seat time.

These requirements may also serve as disincentives to teacher retention. Talented probationary teachers may be unwilling to invest their time and resources in additional education coursework.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

In addition to three years' teaching experience and completing the mentoring requirement, **New Mexico** requires new teachers to submit a professional development dossier to advance from the probationary to nonprobationary certificate. The dossier is divided into five strands, including evidence of teacher effectiveness and evidence of student learning, and teachers must meet or exceed the standards in all strands to advance.

II Ire	

 Permanent licensure refers to the right to practice; permanent status, or tenure, is a condition of employment. In most states, the conferral of each is separate and unrelated.

Do states require teachers to show evidence of effectiveness before conferring permanent licensure?¹

,	No evidence of effectiveness	Some evidence of effectiveness	Preponderant evidence of effectiveness
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California			
Colorado			
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
Florida			
Georgia			
Hawaii			
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
lowa			
Kansas			
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Maryland			
Massachusetts	_		
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Michigan			
Minnesota			
Mississippi			
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Montana			
Nebraska			
Nevada			
New Hampshire			
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina			
North Dakota			
Ohio			
Oklahoma			
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			
South Carolina			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia			
Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	35	15	1

Do states require teachers to earn advanced degrees before conferring permanent licensure?





Figure 19

Do states require teachers to take additional, nonspecific coursework before conferring permanent licensure?



1 Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.

1 Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, New York and Oregon.

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 3 – Pay Scales

The state should ensure that the only factors required when moving from a probationary to a nonprobationary license are those known to advance teacher effectiveness.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. While the state may articulate teachers' starting salaries, it should not require districts to adhere to a state-dictated salary schedule that sets minimum pay for every level.
- 2. The state should discourage districts from tying additional compensation to advanced degrees. The state should eliminate salary schedules that establish higher minimum salaries or other requirements to pay more to teachers with advanced degrees.
- 3. The state should discourage salary schedules that imply that teachers with the most experience are the most effective. The state should eliminate salary schedules that require that the highest steps on the pay scale be determined solely by seniority.

FINDINGS

Most teachers are paid according to anachronistic salary schedules that tie compensation only to years of experience and advanced degrees. In 17 states, these salary schedules are established at the state level, preventing local districts from determining teacher compensation packages that best meet local needs. Eighteen states—whether or not they have state salary schedules—require districts to pay teachers who have advanced degrees higher salaries, despite extensive research showing that advanced degrees do not impact teacher effectiveness.

This salary structure does not promote the retention of effective teachers early in their careers. These teachers have no opportunity to earn a higher salary without obtaining a degree of questionable value or simply growing older. Twenty-six states give districts full authority over teacher pay rates, which should encourage compensation reform.

Figure 20 How States are Faring on Pay Scales **Best Practice States** 0 States Meet Goal States Nearly Meet Goal 31 States Partly Meet Goal Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming 3 States Meet a Small Part of Goal Illinois, Rhode Island, Texas 17 States Do Not Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia

What role does the state play in deciding teacher pay rates?

	Sets minimum salary schedule	Sets minimum salary	Gives full authority to districts
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California			
Colorado			1
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
Florida			_
Georgia			
Hawaii			
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
lowa			
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Nevada			
New Hampshire			
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina			
North Dakota			
Ohio			
Oklahoma			
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			2
South Carolina			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia			
Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	17	8	26

However, states may need to be more proactive. Without compromising districts' autonomy, states should also look for ways that they can encourage local districts to move away from the traditional experience/advanced degree salary structure. No state has currently adopted such a strategy.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Unfortunately, NCTQ cannot highlight any state's policy in this area. Twenty-six states do not require districts to adhere to salary schedules or minimum salary requirements, giving them full control of teacher pay rates. No state has yet articulated a policy that discourages tying compensation to advanced degrees or basing salary solely on years of experience.

Figure 22

What role does the state play in deciding teacher pay rates?




Figure 21

- ¹ Colorado gives districts option of a salary schedule, a performance pay policy or a combination of both.
- 2 Rhode Island requires that local district salary schedules are based on years of service, experience and training.

Do states require districts to pay more to teachers who have earned advanced degrees?

Alabama	-	Yes	No	
Arizona	Alabama			
Arkansas	Alaska			
California Colorado1 Connecticut Connecticut Delaware Connecticut District of Columbia Connecticut Florida Connecticut Georgia Connecticut Hawaii Connecticut Idaho2 Connecticut Illinois Connecticut Indiana Connecticut Iowa Connecticut Kansas Connecticut Indiana Connecticut Iowa Connecticut Kansas Connecticut Iowa Connecticut Kansas Connecticut Iowa Connecticut Kansas Connecticut Iowa Connecticut Kansas Connecticut Maine Connecticut Maine Connecticut Massachusetts Connecticut Minnesota Connecticut Minnesota Connecticut Missouri Connecticut Montana Connecticut New Hampshire Connecticut New	Arizona			
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Connecticut	California			
District of Columbia Image: Second Secon	Colorado ¹			
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West Virginia				
Wisconsin Wyoming	-			
Wyoming				
18 33			-	
		18	33	

- Figure 23 1 If districts choose to have salary schedules, one variable must be teachers' education.
- 2 Idaho refers to "education index" in district-determined schedules.
- 3 Rhode Island requires local district salary schedules to include teacher "training."

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 4 – Retention Pay

The state should support retention pay, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure is awarded, for effective teachers.



GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should encourage districts to provide a significant pay increase to teachers awarded tenure, provided tenure is based on sufficient data to determine effectiveness.
- 2. The state should not support longevity bonuses, which are awarded at the end of teachers' careers and do not provide effective retention strategies.

FINDINGS

No state encourages local districts to provide significant pay increases to teachers awarded tenure. Although this pay increase could become an important strategy for retaining effective teachers early in their careers, it is for the best that states have not yet pursued this approach. A retention bonus tied to the awarding of tenure is only smart policy if tenure decisions are made through a meaningful process based on cumulative evidence of teacher effectiveness. As shown in Goal 1.3, tenure is awarded virtually automatically in almost every state.

Reform of tenure policies is a necessary precursor to this retention strategy.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Unfortunately, NCTQ cannot highlight any state's policy in this area.

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 5 – Compensation for Prior Work Experience

The state should encourage districts to provide compensation for related prior subject-area work experience.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

 The state should encourage districts to compensate new teachers with relevant prior work experience through mechanisms such as starting these teachers at an advanced step on the pay scale. Further, the state should not have regulatory language that would block such strategies.

FINDINGS

Most states have not recognized compensation for teachers with prior relevant work experience as an important retention strategy.

New teachers are not necessarily new to the workforce. Increasing numbers of career changers are entering the teaching profession. Many of these teachers have relevant prior work experience particularly in areas such as math and science, where chronic shortages make these candidates even more desirable. Yet most salary schedules fail to compensate new teachers for relevant prior work experience, setting their salaries at the same level as other first-year teachers. Only five states direct local districts to compensate teachers for related prior work experience.


Figure 25

How States are Faring on Compensation for Prior Work Experience

North Carolina State Meets Goal California States Nearly Meet Goal States Partly Meet Goal Delaware, Georgia, Texas States Meet a Small Part of Goal 46 States Do Not Meet Goal Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming

> NCTQ STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 2008 : 83 NATIONAL SUMMARY

Do states direct districts to compensate teachers for related prior work experience?



1 California, Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina and Texas.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

North Carolina compensates new teachers with relevant prior-work experience by awarding them one year of experience credit for every year of fulltime work, after earning a bachelor's degree, that is related to their area of licensure and work assignment. One year of credit is awarded for every two years of work experience completed prior to earning a bachelor's degree.

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 6 – Differential Pay for Shortage Areas

The state should support retention pay, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure is awarded, for effective teachers.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should support differential pay for effective teaching in shortage subject areas.
- 2. The state should support differential pay for effective teaching in high-needs schools.
- 3. The state should not have regulatory language that would block differential pay.

FINDINGS

Many states do support incentives to teach in highneeds schools or shortage subject areas, which can be important strategies for retaining effective teachers early in their careers. Thirty-four states provide incentives in at least one of these areas; 22 states provide them in both.


Twenty-eight states provide incentives (differential pay or loan forgiveness) to teach in high-needs schools, and 26 states provide incentives to teach shortage subject areas.

In addition to being retention strategies, these differentials can also help to promote the equitable distribution of quality teachers throughout states.

Figure 27

(9

How States are Faring on Differential Pay for Shortage Areas



17 States Meet Goal Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming

3 States Nearly Meet Goal Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington

5 States Partly Meet Goal Colorado, Iowa, North Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin

States Meet a Small Part of Goal Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont

17 States Do Not Meet Goal Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia

Do states provide incentives to teach in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas?

	High-nee Differentia pay	ds schools Loan forgiveness	Shortage s Differential pay	ubject areas Loan forgiveness	No support
Alabama					
Alaska					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut ¹					
Delaware					
District of Columbia					
Florida					
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana					
lowa					
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Oklahoma					
Oregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina					
South Dakota ³					
Tennessee					
Texas					
Utah					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
	22	7	20	9	17

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Seventeen states meet this goal, and although NCTQ has not singled out one state's policy for best practice honors, **Louisiana**, **Nevada**, **New York** and **Texas** are commended for not only supporting differential pay for teaching in shortage subject areas and in high-needs schools but also for offering meaningful incentive amounts.

California, **Georgia** and **Hawaii** are also noteworthy because these states provide incentives for National Board Certified teachers to work in high-needs schools.

Figure 28

- 1 Connecticut offers mortgage assistance and incentives to retired teachers.
- 2 Maryland offers tuition reimbursement for retraining in the areas of mathematics and science, if the teacher agrees to teach in the public school system for at least two years following certification. It also offers a stipend to alternate route candidates who agree to teach math, science or special education in a state public school for at least three years.
- South Dakota offers scholarships and signing bonuses.

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 7 – Performance Pay

The state should support performance pay, but in a manner that recognizes its infancy, appropriate uses and limitations.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should support performance pay efforts, rewarding teachers for their effectiveness in the classroom.
- 2. The state should allow districts flexibility to define the criteria for performance pay; however, the state should ensure that districts' criteria are connected to evidence of student achievement.
- 3. Any performance pay plan should allow for the participation of all teachers, not just those with students who take standardized tests.

FINDINGS

A significant number of states have launched performance pay initiatives, which provide opportunities to reward those teachers who consistently get positive results from their students. Unfortunately, not all states with performance pay have programs that recognize its appropriate uses and limitations.

Twenty states support performance pay. Of these, four have launched pilot programs, which is a wise approach that lets states fine-tune their guidelines before scaling up statewide. Only 16 states explicitly connect performance pay to evidence of student achievement, and only 13 ensure that all teachers are able to participate, whether or not they have students who take standardized tests.

Figure 29

How States are Faring on Performance Pay Image: Best Practice State Tennessee

11 States Meet Goal Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,

Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah

3 States Nearly Meet Goal Alaska, California, Oklahoma

 5 States Partly Meet Goal Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina

0 States Meet a Small Part of Goal

31 States Do Not Meet Goal

Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming

Do states support performance pay?

	Supports perfomance pay	Does not support performance pay	Connects performance pay to evidence of student achievement	open to all teachers
Alabama	1			
Alaska	1			
Arizona				
Arkansas				
California ²				
Colorado				
Connecticut				
Delaware				
District of Columbia				
Florida				
Georgia				
Hawaii				
Idaho				
Illinois				
Indiana				
lowa				
Kansas				
Kentucky				
Louisiana				
Maine				
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Minnesota				
Mississippi				
Missouri				
Montana				
Nebraska				
Nevada				
New Hampshire				
New Jersey				
New Mexico				
New York				
North Carolina				
North Dakota				
Ohio	1			
Oklahoma				
Oregon				
Pennsylvania				
Rhode Island				
South Carolina				
South Dakota	1			
Tennessee				
Texas				
Utah				
Vermont				
Virginia				
Washington				
West Virginia				
Wisconsin				
Wyoming				
	20	31	16	13

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Tennessee requires differentiated pay plans, which may include performance pay. If districts choose to include a performance component, it must be based on student achievement gains and be criterion-based so that all teachers meeting the standard, not just those with students who take standardized tests, are eligible for the reward. Although the state does not dictate specific incentive amounts, it requires that the awards be significant enough to make a difference to teachers.

Figure 30

 Alaska, Alabama, Ohio and South Dakota fund pilot programs.
 California only offers incentives to teachers in underachieving schools.

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 8 – Pension Flexibility

The state should ensure that pension systems are portable, flexible and fair to all teachers.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. Participants in the state's pension system should have the option of a defined contribution plan as their primary pension plan.
- 2. Participants in the state's pension system should be vested no later than the third year of employment.
- 3. Mandatory employee and employer contribution rates should not be unreasonably high. Excessively high employee contribution rates are particularly problematic for teachers with lower salaries, while excessive employer contributions commit district resources that could otherwise be spent on salaries or incentives.
- 4. Defined benefit plans should offer the option of a lump-sum withdrawal upon employment termination. This option at minimum should include employee contributions and accrued interest at a fair interest rate. In addition, withdrawal options from either defined benefit or defined contribution plans should include funds contributed by the employer.
- Defined benefit plans should allow participants to purchase time for unlimited previous teaching experience at the time of employment. Teachers should also be allowed to purchase time for all official leaves of absence, such as maternity and paternity leave.

FINDINGS

In addition to their salaries, virtually all teachers are also entitled to a pension as part of their compensation packages. In an era when pension benefits have been declining across industries and professions, teachers' pensions remain a fixture. In fact, nearly all states continue to provide teachers with defined benefit pension plans, which are expensive and inflexible models that do not reflect the

Figure 31

How States are Faring on Pension Flexibility

*	0	Best Practice States
	1	State Meets Goal Alaska
4	5	States Nearly Meet Goal California, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia
•	19	States Partly Meet Goal Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming
٢	14	States Meet a Small Part of Goal Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee
0	12	States Do Not Meet Goal Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia

Glossary

Benefit Formula:

Formula used to calculate the amount teachers will receive each month after retirement. The most common formula used is *years of service x final average salary x benefit multiplier*. This amount is divided by 12 to calculate monthly benefits.

Benefit Multiplier:

Multiplier used in the benefit formula. It, along with years of service, determines the total percentage of final average salary that a teacher will receive in retirement benefits. In some plans, the multiplier is not constant, but changes depending upon retirement age and/or years of service.

Defined Benefit Plan:

Pension plan that promises to pay a specified amount to each person who retires after a set number of years of service. Employees contribute to them in some cases; in others, all contributions are made by the employer.

Defined Contribution Plan:

Pension plan in which the level of contributions is fixed at a certain level, while benefits vary depending on the return from the investments. Employees make contributions into a tax-deferred account, and employers may or may not make contributions. Defined contribution pension plans, unlike defined benefit pension plans, give the employee options of where to invest the account, usually among stock, bond and money market accounts.

Lump-sum Withdrawal:

Large payment of money received at one time instead of in periodic payments. Teachers leaving a pension plan may receive a lump-sum distribution of the value of their pension.

Pension Wealth:

The net present value of a teacher's expected lifetime retirement benefits.

Purchasing Time:

A teacher may make additional contributions to a pension system to increase service credit. Time may be purchased for a number of reasons, such as professional development leave, previous out-of-state teaching experience, medical leaves of absence or military service.

Service Credit/Years of Service:

Accumulated period of time in years or partial years, for which a teacher earned compensation subject to contributions.

Supplemental Retirement Plan:

An optional plan to which teachers may voluntarily make taxdeferred contributions in addition to their mandatory pension plans. Employees are usually able to choose their rate of contribution up to a maximum set by the IRS; some employers also make contributions. These plans are generally in the form of 457 and 403(b) programs.

Vesting:

Right an employee gradually acquires by length of service to receive employer-contributed benefits, such as payments from a pension fund.

realities of the modern workforce, and significantly disadvantage teachers early in their careers.

Only one state no longer provides teachers with defined benefit pension plans, providing teachers instead with defined contribution plans. Three states offer teachers a choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans, and another three offer hybrid plans that have elements of both. The remaining 44 states provide defined benefit plans, although 14 of these states also offer optional defined contribution supplemental plans.

The lack of portability of defined benefit plans is a disincentive to an increasingly mobile teaching force. To younger teachers in particular, a defined benefit plan may seem like a meaningless part of the compensation package. A pension plan that cannot move across state lines and requires a long time commitment may not seem like much of a benefit at all to teachers early in their careers.

This perception may be heightened by the fact that most states also make teachers wait for a considerable period of time before they are vested in the retirement system. All but three states make teachers wait more than three years; nine states make teachers wait for 10 or more years. Teachers who leave the system before vesting do not receive benefits upon retiring; they can only withdraw their funds. In some states, teachers are not even entitled to withdraw the full amount they contributed.

Pension systems also disadvantage teachers early in their careers by committing districts' compensation resources to retirement benefits. Local districts in some states are required to contribute as much as 20 percent of teachers' salaries to the pension system and/or Social Security. Lower contribution rates (in states where they are too high) would free up resources that might fund many of the strategies for retaining effective teachers recommended by this edition of the *Yearbook*.

Figure 32

Sources: Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, Seventh Edition and California State Teachers' Retirement System's glossary, http://www.calstrs.com/Members/Defined%20B enefit%20Program/glossary.aspx.

Do state pension systems have a defined contribution option?

Alabama		Defined benefit plan only	Defined benefit plan with defined contribution supplemental plan	Hybrid plan ¹	Choice of defined benefi or defined contribution plan	t Defined contribution plan only
Arizona	Alabama					
Arkansas	Alaska					
California California Colorado Connecticut Connecticut California Delaware California District of Columbia California Florida California Florida California Georgia California Hawaii California Illinois California Indiana California	Arizona					
Colorado	Arkansas					
Connecticut	California					
Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Georgia Hawaii Illinois Indiana Indiana Iowa Indiana Iowa Indiana Iowa Indiana Iowa Indiana Indiana Indiana Iowa Indiana Iowa Iowa	Colorado					
District of Columbia	Connecticut					
Florida	Delaware					
Georgia	District of Columbia					
Hawaii Image: Sector of the sector of	Florida					
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South Carolina						
South Dakota						
Tennessee Texas Texas Utah Utah Vermont Image: Straight of the straight of						
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Virginia						
Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming						
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Wisconsin Image: Wyoming						
Wyoming						
20 1/ 2 2 1	Wyoming					
50 14 5 5 I		30	14	3	3	1


Figure 33 1 A hybrid plan has components of both a defined benefit plan and a defined contri-bution plan.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Alaska provides a fair and flexible defined contribution pension plan for all teachers. This plan is also highly portable, as teachers are entitled to 100 percent of employer contributions after five years of service. **South Dakota**'s defined benefit plan has some creative provisions, which makes it more like a defined contribution plan. Most notably, teachers are able to withdraw 100 percent of their employer contributions after three years of service. In addition, **Florida**, **Ohio** and **South Carolina** are noteworthy for offering teachers a choice between a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan.

Figure 34

Do state pension systems have a defined contribution option?



1 A hybrid plan has components of both a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT West Virginia's Cautionary Tale

Education and individual retirement planning advice is a critical aspect of any state's pension plan, as evidenced by the tribulations of West Virginia's teacher pension system. In 1991, facing financial troubles, West Virginia closed its defined benefit Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) to new members and opened the Teachers' Defined Contribution plan (TDC). However, after widespread dissatisfaction with TDC account balances, it was closed to new members in 2005, and TRS was reopened. In 2008, the state legislature gave TDC participants a one-time option to switch their account balances from TDC to TRS in order to receive retirement payments according to the defined benefit formula. Over 78 percent of teachers elected to transfer.

While these events may appear to argue against states' offering defined contribution plans, West Virginia's experience should be viewed as a cautionary tale of the need for proper investment education. The implementation of the defined contribution plan was not handled well. In fact, some teachers believe they were so poorly advised that they have filed suit against the investment firm managing the plan. About three-fourths of teachers invested solely in low-yield, low-risk annuities that performed only slightly better than some savings accounts. For example, the Associated Press found that from May 2005 to May 2008, these annuities provided only their guaranteed 4.5 percent annual return. Over this same time period, the S&P 500 had an average rate of return of over 7 percent per year.

Defined contribution plans provide teachers flexibility in their retirement savings, but such plans are not without risk. States have a responsibility to educate teachers on their financial options and how to invest at different stages in life.

How much do state pension systems require teachers to contribute?

Employee contribution rate

Social Security contribution (+ 6.2%)

	0% 	5% 	10% 	15% 	20%
Alabama					
Alaska					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut					
Delaware ¹					
District of Columbia					
Florida					
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana					
lowa					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland					
Massachusetts					
Michigan ²					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
Missouri					
Montana					
Nebraska					
Nevada					
New Hampshire					
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
New York ³					
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Ohio					
Oklahoma					
Oregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina					
South Dakota					
Tennessee					
Texas					
Utah					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington ⁴					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					

Figure 35

What is a reasonable rate for pension contributions?

Reasonable Mandatory Contribution Rate Range:

- 4-7 percent each for teachers and districts in states participating in Social Security
- 10-13 percent each for teachers and districts in states not participating in Social Security

Analysts generally agree that workers in their 20's with no previous retirement savings should save, in addition to Social Security contributions, about 10-15 percent of their gross income in order to be able to live during retirement on 80 percent of the salary they were earning when they retired. While the recommended savings rate varies with age and existing retirement savings, NCTQ has used this 10-15 percent benchmark as a reasonable rate for its analyses. To achieve a total savings of 10-15 percent, teacher and employer contributions should each be in the range of 4-7 percent. In states where teachers do not participate in Social Security, the total recommended retirement savings (teacher plus employer contributions) is about 12 percent higher, to compensate for the fact that these teachers will not have Social Security income when they retire. In order to achieve the appropriate level of total savings, teacher and employer contributions in these states should *each* be in the range of 10-13 percent.

Sources:

http://personal.fidelity.com/planning/retirement/plan_overview. shtml.cvsr?refpr=rrc54

http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/research_strategies/ market_insight/retirement_strategies/planning/how_much_ should_you_save_for_retirement_play_the_percentages.html https://personal.vanguard.com/us/planningeducation/retirement/ PEdRetInvHowMuchToSaveContent_jsp#early

Figure 36

- 1 There is no employee contribution for income below \$6,000. 2 The rate is 3 percent of pay up to \$5,000, 3.6 percent of pay up to \$15,000
- 3 The rate is 3 percent until 10 years of service, after which there is no employee contribution.
- 4 The rate is 4.26 for the defined benefit plan. The rate varies for the defined contribution plan with a minimum of 5 percent.


How much do state pension systems require school districts to contribute?

- Employer contribution rate

Social Security contribu	ution (+6.2%)
	0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Alabama	
Alaska	
Arizona	
Arkansas	
California	
Colorado	
Connecticut	
Delaware	
District of Columbia	
Florida	
Georgia	
Hawaii	
Idaho	
Illinois	
Indiana	
lowa	
Kansas	
Kentucky	
Louisiana	
Maine	
Maryland	
Massachusetts	
Michigan	
Minnesota	
Mississippi	
Missouri	
Montana	
Nebraska	
Nevada	
New Hampshire	
New Jersey	
New Mexico	
New York	
North Carolina	
North Dakota	
Ohio	
Oklahoma	
Oregon	
Pennsylvania	
Rhode Island	
South Carolina	
South Dakota	
Tennessee	
Texas	
Utah	
Vermont	
Virginia	
Washington	
West Virginia ¹	
Wisconsin	
Wyoming	

Figure 38

Do states permit teachers to purchase time for previous teaching experience?¹



1 Alaska only offers a defined contribution plan; purchase of time does not apply.

2 Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, New York, Oregon and Tennessee. 3 Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah.

Figure 39

Do states permit teachers to purchase time for leaves of absence?1




- 1 Alaska only offers a defined contribution plan; purchase of time does not apply.
- 2 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and Washington.
- 3 Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio and Utah allow at least one year per leave and an unlimited number of leaves.

Figure 37

1 The employer contribution is 15 percent for employees hired prior to July 2005.

Figure 40 How many years before teachers vest?



- 1 Florida's defined benefit plan does not vest until year six; teachers vest in the state's defined contribution plan after one year.
- 2 Ohio's defined benefit plan does not vest until year five; teachers vest in the state's defined contribution plan after one year.
- 3 South Carolina's defined benefit plan does not vest until year five; teachers vest immediately in the state's defined contribution plan.
- 4 Based on Washington's Plan 2. The state also offers a hybrid plan in which teachers vest immediately in the defined contribution component and vest in the defined benefit component after 10 years.

Figure	41
--------	----

How many years before teachers vest?

How many years				
	3 years or less	4 or 5 years	6 to 9 years	10+ years
Alabama				
Alaska				
Arizona				
Arkansas				
California				
Colorado				
Connecticut				
Delaware				
District of Columbia				
Florida ¹				
Georgia				
Hawaii				
Idaho				
Illinois				
Indiana				
lowa				
Kansas				
Kentucky				
Louisiana				
Maine				
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Minnesota				
Mississippi				
Missouri				
Montana				
Nebraska				
Nevada				
New Hampshire				
New Jersey				
New Mexico				
New York				
North Carolina				
North Dakota				
Ohio ²				
Oklahoma				
Oregon				
Pennsylvania				
Rhode Island				
South Carolina ³				
South Dakota				
Tennessee				
Texas				
Utah				
Vermont				
Virginia				
Washington ⁴				
West Virginia				
Wisconsin				
Wyoming				
	3	37	2	9

What funds do states permit teachers to withdraw from their defined benefit plans if they leave after five years?¹

	Less than their own contribution	Only their own contribution	Their own contribution plus interest	Their own contribution and part of the employer contribution plus interest	Their own contribution and full employer contribution plus interest
Alabama					
Alaska ²					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut					
Delaware					
District of Columbia					
Florida ³					
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana ⁴					
lowa					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland					
Massachusetts					
Michigan					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
Missouri					
Montana					
Nebraska					
Nevada ⁵					
New Hampshire					
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
New York					
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Ohio ⁶					
Oklahoma					
Oregon ⁷					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina ⁸					
South Dakota					
Tennessee					
Texas					
Utah ⁹					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington ¹⁰					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
,					
	3	3	35	5	1

Figure 42

- 1 Some states' withdrawal policies vary depending on teachers' years of service. Year five is used as a common point of comparision.
- 2 As of July 1, 2006, Alaska only offers a defined contribution plan to new members, which allows teachers leaving the system after five years to withdraw 100 percent of the employer contribution.
- 3 Since Florida teachers do not contribute to the defined benefit plan, the only funds participants could withdraw upon leaving are those made for special circumstances such as purchasing time. Florida also has a defined contribution plan, which allows teachers with at least one year of service who are leaving the system to withdraw 100 percent of the employer contribution.
- 4 Teachers transferring to another governmental retirement plan may also withdraw the amount necessary to purchase creditable service in the new plan.
- 5 Most teachers in Nevada are in a noncontributory defined benefit system, and thus do not have contributions to withdraw. The small minority that are in a contributory system may withdraw their contributions plus interest.
- 6 Ohio has two other pension plans. Ohio's defined contribution plan allows teachers with at least one year of service who are leaving the system to withdraw 100 percent of the employer contribution. Exiting teachers with at least five years of experience in Ohio's combination plan may withdraw their employee-funded defined contribution component, but must wait until age 50 to withdraw funds from the employer-funded defined benefit component.
- 7 Oregon only has a hybrid retirement plan, which allows exiting teachers to withdraw their contributions plus earnings from their defined contribution component; they still receive the employer-funded defined benefit payments at retirement age.
- 8 South Carolina also has a defined contribution plan, which allows exiting teachers to withdraw 100 percent of their contributions and employer contributions, plus interest.
- 9 Since Utah teachers do not contribute to the defined benefit plan, the only funds participants could withdraw upon leaving are those made for special circumstances such as purchasing time.
- 10 Washington also has a hybrid retirement plan, which allows exiting teachers to withdraw their contributions plus earnings from their defined contribution component; they still receive the employer-funded defined benefit payments at retirement age.

Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers Goal 9 – Pension Neutrality

The state should ensure that pension systems are neutral, uniformly increasing pension wealth with each additional year of work.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The formula that determines pension benefits should be neutral to the number of years worked. It should not have a multiplier that increases with years of service or longevity bonuses.
- 2. The formula for determining benefits should preserve incentives for teachers to continue working until conventional retirement ages. Eligibility for retirement benefits should be based on age and not years of service.

FINDINGS

Most states' pension systems are not neutral, meaning that each year of work does not accrue pension wealth in a uniform way. The inequities that are built into formulas for calculating pension benefits are generally to the advantage of veteran teachers.

Fifteen states use multipliers to calculate retirement benefits that increase with years of service. As these multipliers increase, more experienced teachers receive even more generous benefits.

Another way that pension benefits are not awarded fairly is through the common policy of setting retirement eligibility at different ages and years of services. A fair system sets a standard, conventional retirement age for all teachers, without factoring in years of service. This does not mean that all teachers receive the same benefits regardless of years of service, merely that eligibility would be determined in a way that treats all teachers equitably. Forty-five states determine eligibility based on years of service, at a price of hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional benefits per teacher.

Figure 43

How States are Faring on Pension Neutrality

*	2	Best Practice States Alaska, South Dakota
	1	State Meets Goal Minnesota
	5	States Nearly Meet Goal Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin
	30	States Partly Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia
٠	1	State Meets a Small Part of Goal Pennsylvania
\bigcirc	12	States Do Not Meet Goal Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, Wyoming

Do states base retirement eligibility on age, which is fair to all teachers?¹



 This only refers to determining retirement eligibility, not retirement benefits.


2 Alaska, California, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Washington.

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Alaska offers a defined contribution pension plan that is neutral, with pension wealth accumulating in an equal way for all teachers for each year of work. **Minnesota** and **South Dakota** offer defined benefit plans that have neutral formulas. Both states' plans have formula multipliers that do not change relative to years of service, and they do not allow unreduced benefits to retirees below age 65.

Figure 45

What kind of multiplier do states use to calculate retirement benefits?¹



 Alaska has a defined contribution plan, which does not have a benefit multiplier.

2 Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and Wyoming.

How much do states pay for each teacher that retires with unreduced benefits at an early age?¹

	Total amount in benefits paid per teacher from the time of retirement until age 65	Earliest retirement age that a teacher who started teaching at age 22 may receive unreduced benefits
Alaska ²		
Minnesota ³	\$0	65
South Dakota	\$0	65
Washington	\$0	65
Arizona	\$271,275	51
California	\$310,028	61
Indiana	\$317,728	55
New Hampshire	\$321,326	60
Oregon	\$361,536	58
Wisconsin	\$416,007	57
Rhode Island	\$430,013	59
Texas	\$443,421	60
Michigan	\$468,590	52
Kansas	\$492,342	54
Tennessee	\$499,973	52
Montana	\$518,228	47
Connecticut	\$520,009	57
Vermont	\$520,655	52
New Jersey	\$525,117	55
Virginia	\$531,068	52
lowa	\$551,428	55
Idaho	\$551,743	56
North Dakota	\$551,743	56
Oklahoma	\$551,743	56
Florida	\$557,112	50
New York	\$557,518	52
Maryland	\$562,308	52
North Carolina	\$568,555	52
Illinois	\$572,010	52
South Carolina	\$577,142	50
Hawaii	\$577,687	55
Nebraska	\$577,687	55
West Virginia	\$577,687	55
Delaware	\$577,927	52
District of Columbi		52
Massachusetts ⁴	\$594,296	57
Wyoming	\$615,994	54
Maine	\$621,861	47
Mississippi	\$621,861	47
Georgia	\$624,786	52
Utah	\$624,786	52
Alabama	\$624,786	47
Pennsylvania	\$625,747 \$650,011	47 57
Arkansas	\$681,789	50
Ohio ⁵	\$687,265	52
New Mexico	\$087,205	47
Louisiana	\$730,080	47 52
Missouri	\$780,983	52
		51
Colorado	\$789,343	49
Kentucky	\$791,679	
Nevada	\$834,090	52

Figure 46

- 1 All calculations are based on a teacher who starts teaching at age 22, earns a starting salary of \$35,000 that increases 3 percent per year, and retires at the age when s/he is first eligible for unreduced benefits. The calculations use states' current benefit formulas and do not include cost of living increases. The final average salary was calculated as the average of the highest three years of salary, even though a few states may vary from that standard. Age 65 was used as the point of comparision for standard retirement age because it is the minimum eligibility age for unreduced Social Security benefits.

- Does not apply to Alaska's defined contribution plan.
 Minnesota provides unreduced retirement benefits at the age of full Social Security benefits or age 66, whichever comes first.
 Massachusetts's formula has many options for retirement. A teacher with 35 years of experience at age 57 would reach the maximum benefit.
- 5 Applies only to Ohio's defined benefit plan.

Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers Goal 1 – New Teacher Evaluation

The state should require multiple formal evaluations of all new teachers.

GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should require that all new, nonpermanent teachers receive at least two formal evaluations annually.
- 2. New teachers should be formally evaluated at least once during the first half of their first year.

FINDINGS

Evaluations are an important tool for providing support and holding teachers accountable. This is especially true for new teachers. In the absence of good metrics for determining who will be an effective teacher before individuals begin to teach, it is critical that new teachers' performances are closely monitored. Yet less than half of the states require new teachers to be evaluated more than once during a school year.

Twenty-three states require that new teachers are evaluated two or more times per year. Nineteen states require a single annual evaluation, and nine states do not require any evaluation at all.

Not only must new teachers be evaluated, but they should have their first evaluation during the first half of the school year, so that they can receive feedback and support early on, especially if there is any indication of unsatisfactory performance. That way, the teacher and school or district leadership can implement a plan for improvement, rather than potentially allow an ineffective new teacher to remain in the classroom without support. Unfortunately, only 16 states require that new teachers are evaluated early in the school year.

Figure 47

How States are Faring on New Teacher Evaluation



Best Practice States Kansas, Oklahoma

13 States Meet Goal

Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia

States Nearly Meet Goal Arizona, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming

1 State Partly Meets Goal Arkansas

• 17 States Meet a Small Part of Goal

Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin

<mark>) 9</mark> 9

States Do Not Meet Goal

District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Both **Kansas** and **Oklahoma** require new teachers to be formally evaluated twice a year. In Kansas, each evaluation must be scheduled not later than the 60th day of the semester, and in Oklahoma, the first evaluation must be completed before November 15, ensuring that new teachers are assessed and receive feedback early in the year, and that unsatisfactory performance is addressed with an improvement plan.

Figure 48

How many times do states require districts to evaluate a new teacher during a school year?



Figure 49

- Alabama, Missouri, North Carolina and West Virginia require one formal evaluation, but also three observations with follow-up conferences.
- 2 Arkansas also requires three observations by a mentor.
- 3 Washington and Delaware require one formal evaluation, but also two observations with follow-up conferences.
- 4 Third year teachers are only evaluated twice in Tennessee.


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Figure 49

How many times do states require districts to evaluate a new teacher during a school year?

	Not addressed	1 time	2 times	3 or more times
Alabama ¹				
Alaska				
Arizona				
Arkansas ²				
California				
Colorado				
Connecticut				
Delaware ³				
District of Columbia				
Florida				
Georgia				
Hawaii				
Idaho				
Illinois				
Indiana				
lowa				
Kansas				
Kentucky				
Louisiana				
Maine				
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Minnesota				
Mississippi Missouri ¹				
Montana				
Nebraska				
Nevada				
New Hampshire				
New Jersey				
New Mexico		_		
New York				
North Carolina ¹				
North Dakota				
Ohio				
Oklahoma				
Oregon				
Pennsylvania				
Rhode Island				
South Carolina				
South Dakota				
Tennessee ⁴				
Texas				
Utah				
Vermont				
Virginia				
Washington ³				
West Virginia ¹				
Wisconsin				
Wyoming				

Do states require districts to evaluate new teachers early in the school year?



1 Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina. Washington and West Virginia.

 South Carolina, Washington and West Virginia.
 District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Vermont.

Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers Goal 2 – Unsatisfactory Evaluations

The state should articulate consequences for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations, including specifying that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations are eligible for dismissal.



GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- The state should require that all teachers who have received a single unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan whether or not they have tenure.
- 2. The state should require that all teachers who receive two consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations or two unsatisfactory evaluations within five years be formally eligible for dismissal — whether or not they have tenure.

FINDINGS

Many states allow teacher evaluations to be regarded as a formality without significance or consequence. Only half of the states articulate any consequences for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations.

Twenty-six states require that any teacher who receives an unsatisfactory rating be placed on an improvement plan. The rest of the states offer no direction to local districts that actions should be taken to try to address the areas of concern.

Still fewer states articulate consequences for multiple unsatisfactory evaluations. While teachers who receive negative evaluations should receive support and additional training, opportunities to improve should not be unlimited. Ineffective teachers who are allowed to remain in classrooms indefinitely place students at risk. Only 13 states specify that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations should be eligible for dismissal.


What are the consequences for teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations?

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Illinois and **Oklahoma** both require that teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations be placed on improvement plans. Teachers in Illinois are then evaluated three times during a 90-day remediation period and are eligible for dismissal if performance remains unsatisfactory. Oklahoma's improvement plan may not exceed two months and if performance does not improve during that time, teachers are eligible for dismissal.

Figure 52

Do states specify that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations are eligible for dismissal?



 Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Washington.

Figure 53

- ¹ Any teacher with an unsatisfactory evaluation is immediately dismissed.
- 2 Kentucky does require multiple observations the year following an unsatisfactory evaluation.
- 3 Teachers in low-performing schools can be dismissed after just one negative rating.
- 4 Only teachers on annual contracts are eligible for dismissal after unsatisfactory evaluations.

receive unsatisfe	actory eval	uations?	
		Eligible for dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory	
	rating	ratings	consequences
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California			
Colorado			
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
Florida			
Georgia			
Hawaii ¹			
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
lowa Kansas			
Kentucky ²			
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Michigan Minnesota			
Mississippi			
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New Hampshire			
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina ³			
North Dakota			
Ohio			
Oklahoma			
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			
South Carolina ⁴			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia			
Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	25	-	
	26	13	23

Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers Goal 3 – Licensure Loopholes

The state should close loopholes that allow teachers who have not met licensure requirements to continue teaching.



GOAL COMPONENTS

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. Under no circumstances should a state award a standard license to a teacher who has not passed all required licensing tests.
- 2. If a state finds it necessary to confer conditional or provisional licenses under limited and exceptional circumstances to teachers who have not passed the required tests, the state should ensure that requirements be met within one year.

FINDINGS

The majority of states place students at risk by allowing teachers in classrooms who have not passed all required licensure tests.

Licensure tests are meant to ensure that a person meets the minimal qualifications to be a teacher. Yet only seven states insist that teachers pass all tests prior to beginning to teach. Eight states give teachers up to two years to pass the tests, and 22 states give teachers three or more years.

It is understandable that states may, under limited circumstances, need to fill a small number of classroom positions with individuals who do not hold full teaching credentials. Twenty states have a sound policy, offering a one-year nonrenewable license in this instance. Twenty-two states, however, issue renewable emergency licenses, meaning that teachers who have not met all minimum requirements are allowed to remain in classrooms for extended—and perhaps indefinite—periods of time.

How long can new teachers practice without passing licensing tests?


	No deferral	Up to 1 year	Up to 2 years ເ	3 years or more (or unspecified)
Alabama				
Alaska				
Arizona				
Arkansas				
California				
Colorado				
Connecticut				
Delaware				
District of Columbia				
Florida				
Georgia				
Hawaii				
Idaho				
Illinois				
Indiana				
lowa ¹				
Kansas				
Kentucky				
Louisiana				
Maine				
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Minnesota				
Mississippi				
Missouri				
Montana ²				
Nebraska ²				
Nevada ³				
New Hampshire				
New Jersey				
New Mexico				
New York				
North Carolina				
North Dakota				
Ohio				
Oklahoma				
Oregon Pennsylvania				
Rhode Island				
South Carolina				
South Dakota				
Tennessee				
Texas				
Utah				
Vermont				
Virginia				
Washington				
West Virginia				
Wisconsin				
Wyoming ⁴				
	7	12	8	22

EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Both **Colorado** and **New Jersey** require that all new teachers must pass all required subjectmatter tests as a condition of initial licensure.

Figure 56

How long can new teachers practice without passing licensing tests?¹




1 Montana and Nebraska do not currently require licensing tests.

Figure 55

1 lowa only requires subject-matter testing for elementary teachers. 2 Montana and Nebraska do not currently require licensing tests.

3 As of 2010.

4 Wyoming only requires subject-matter testing for elementary and social studies teachers.



1 Not applicable to Montana and Nebraska, which do not require subject-matter testing.2 Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina

- and Virginia.
- 3 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.

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Figure C

Progress toward meeting the retention of effective new teachers

new teachers						\sim
	+ Best	Fully	Nearly	Partly	Meets a	Does not
	practice	meets	meets	meets	small part	meet
Alabama	0	3	1	5	0	6
Alaska	1	2	1	1	3	7
Arizona	0	1	1	3	4	6
Arkansas	0	3	2	4	0	6
California	0	2	2	4	3	4
Colorado	1	1	1	4	4	4
Connecticut	0	0	2	3	5	5
Delaware	0	1	2	4	2	6
District of Columbia	0	0	1	1	1	12
Florida	1	3	0	4	3	4
Georgia	0	1	2	4	2	6
Hawaii	0	1	1	2	4	7
Idaho	0	1	0	3	3	8
Illinois	0	2	0	1	8	4
Indiana	0	1	1	3	2	8
lowa	0	1	1	7	2	4
Kansas	1	0	1	4	2	7
Kentucky	0	3	0	2	3	7
Louisiana	0	3	1	3	3	5
Maine	0	0	1	4	1	9
Maryland	0	1	1	3	2	8
Massachusetts	0	2	1	1	4	7
Michigan	0	0	1	5	5	4
Minnesota	0	2	1	2	2	8
Mississippi	0	2	1	2	1	9
Missouri	0	0	1	5	2	7
Montana	0	0	0	2	2	11
Nebraska	0	0	1	3	4	6
Nevada	0	3	0	2	2	8
New Hampshire	0	0	0	2	3	10
New Jersey	1	2	0	4	1	7
New Mexico	1	2	0	5	2	5
New York	0	1	1	2	2	8
North Carolina	1	1	1	6	2	8 4
North Dakota	0	1	1	2	2	4 9
Ohio	0	3	5	2	2	5
Oklahoma	1	2	2	2	3	5
	0	0	2	2	3	8
Oregon	0	0	3	4	3	5
Pennsylvania Rhode Island	0	0	5 1	4	2	5 11
South Carolina	1	4	3	2	2	4
	1	4	3 1	2	3	4 8
South Dakota						
Tennessee	2	2	1	3	1	6
Texas	0	3	1	2	4	5
Utah Vormo ont	0	1	2	7	1	4
Vermont	0	0	0	4	3	8
Virginia	0	2	2	2	3	6
Washington	0	2	2	3	2	6
West Virginia	0	2	1	3	1	8
Mucconcin	0	0	1	4	5	5
Wisconsin Wyoming	0	1	1	4	0	9

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